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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

A) Introduction
"Discourage
Point out to them

litigation.

how

the

Persuade neighbors

nominal winner

to

compromise whenever you

often the real loser in fees, expenses,

is

can.

and a

waste of time. As a peacemaker the lawyer has a superior opportunity of becoming a

good (person).

"'

The term Alternative Dispute Resolution covers
techniques as mediation, arbitration,

summary jury

trials,

several

dispute resolution

early neutral evaluation, and

minitrials as well as negotiations in general.

This thesis will
traditional

complex

first

court-litigation

in

discuss the advantages of mediation in contrast to the

divorce cases, which cannot satisfactorily solve the

issues in this emotionally exceptional situation.

It

will then focus

on

the

mediation process and describe the variety of alternative dispute resolution techniques
mediators can use to

and help them

to

The main
severe

work out a
part

final

agreement

that is adapted to their individual situation.

of the thesis deals with the weaknesses of mediation

power imbalance between husband and wife and suggests

mediation in certain cases. Finally

^

discussions between the divorcing spouses

facilitate the settlement

Abraham

it

1,

1850, taken from Steven C.

Decision on Divorce Mediation, 26 Idaho L. Rev. 547, Fn
(Century, 1906), reprinted in

UCLA L REV
2

1

507, 507 (1986).
Or...?,

to

Bowman, Idaho 's

referring to F. Hill, Lincoln

Comment, The Mediator Lawyer: Implications for

Lynn A. Kerbeshian, ADR: To Be

limitations

of

address ethical problems with attorney

will

Lincoln, Notes for a law lecture, July

in cases

70 N.D.L. Rev. 381. 382 (1994).

The Lawyer. 102

the Practice of Law, 34

2
participation in mediating divorce cases

difference between lawyer

The

-

and discuss several models to reconcile the

mediators and non- lawyer mediators.

thesis will conclude with a broad discussion of a hotly disputed issue,

namely the protection of confidentiality of information which

parties disclose during the

mediation process.

B) Historical Outline

-

The beginning of Mediation

Several stages of development of Alternative Dispute Resolution methods led to
the mediation technique as

labor disputes,

which were

known today
settled

in the

by mediators

history of mediation in domestic relations

United States. Mediation originated
in the U.S. but also in England^.

however dates back

to the

19**"

century,

in

The

when

churches and other social organizations as schools and communities offered mediation
for spouses

who were

However,
difficulties

matters,

it

about to dissolve their relationship."^

was not

until

1930 that divorce courts more and more realized the

and inefficiency of the traditional adversarial

which

are highly emotional

litigation

and complex. The primary alternatives

to a court

mediation and arbitration, which promote the

litigated process in divorce cases are

discussions between divorcing couples and help them to tackle post
less aggressive

system in family

-

divorce issues in a

and more cooperative way.^ Consequently courts started

to

recommend

mediation to divorcing couples as a voluntary and effective alternative to the costly
litigation process.^

3 John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward
Lawyers,295 {\996).

4

Id. at

F.

Sherman, Processes of Dispute Resolution, The Role of

296.

^ Daniel

Compel

J.

Guttman, For Better Or Worse.

Till

ADR Do

Us Part: Using Antenuptial Agreements

Alternatives To Traditionel Adversarial Litigation, 12

Ohio

St. J.

to

on Dispute Resolution, 175,

181 (1996).

"

John

S.

Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward

Lawyers, 296/297(1996).

F.

Sherman, Processes of Dispute Resolution. The Role of

3

California

was

mediators.^ In 1939
in

which

finally,

established a Conciliation Court for usually undisputed divorces

it

child custody matters^.

on

non

adversarial way.^ In

-

because of the growing number of divorced couples and the

of family law (no

liberalization

develop statutes for

state in the U.S. to

parties got the opportunity to settle their matters in a

1980s

the

most progressive

the

child custody in

It is

pre

-

fault

-

divorce) California mandated mediation for

no longer optional for couples

court settlements; instead

-

become

has

it

an agreement

to try to reach

a presupposition for

litigating this matter in court.

The development of no

-

and the popularity of mediation

fault divorce

in

domestic relations were the consequence of a changed public opinion on divorce. The

was no longer regarded

desire to get divorced

as a morally questionable decision and

law should no longer serve as a punishment for the spouse who was willing
divorced.

It

was time

to

remove condemnation, shame and

The nationwide popularity of mediation
method
in

in divorce cases,

Atlanta

in

Settlement, ^^

the

was

the

Ellen A.

'

from divorce.'^

as an Alternative Dispute Resolution

however, came with O.J. Coogler's Family Mediation Center

1980s.l^

first

family mediation centers

guilt

to get

Coogler's

book,

Structured

Mediation

publication in this field and paved the

all

way

Divorce

in

for establishing

over the United States.

Waldman, The Challenge of

Certification:

How

to

Ensure Mediator Competence while

Preserving Diversity, 30 U.S.F.L. Rev. 723 (1996).
°

John

S.

Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward

F.

Sherman, Processes of Dispute Resolution, the Role of

Lawyers, 296\297 (1996).
9

Id.

'^

Nancy Illman Meyers, Power

(Im) Balance

And The

Divorce, 27 U.Tol.L. Rev. 853, 854 (1996); Judith

Failure

M. Wolf,

Of Impartiality

Sex, Lies

In Attorney

-

Mediated

and Divorce Mediation, 33

-

Nov

Ariz. Att'y 25 (1996).
'
'

Ellen

Soc. Pol'y

Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms In Divorce Mediation, An Argument for

&L.

87(1993).

^2 O.J. Coogler, Structured Mediation in Divorce Settlement (1978).

Inclusion, Va.

J.

4

At present almost

all states in

the United States offer a public mediation service

connected to family courts, which ask divorcing couples to attend

that is closely

mediation sessions either in voluntary or

Coogler was

in

mandatory formJ^ The creative approach of

to bring divorcing parties together

and to help them

to reach

an agreement

under the Marital Mediation Rules - guidelines that were substantially developed from
revised statutes that

some

states

had established

after the

reform of the divorce

law.'**

Coogler's rules, which offered a guideline for settlement of material issues, like marital
property and maintenance, have been basically adopted from existing domestic relations
statutes. ' 5

C) The traditional adversarial model and mediation

-

a comparative

analysis

The
whereas

traditional

in the

litigation

model views divorcing couples "as opponents",

mediation process they are "joint

the role of "soldiers of fortune" in a

-

decision makers" J ^ Attorneys have

war about money, property and custody, whereas

the mediator rather has the role of a diplomat. ^^

communication

'^

Susan Meyers

between

et al..

Resolving Policy Issues,

Divorce Mediation,

Doris Jonas Freed

&

Inclusion, Va.

'"

J.

cooperation

instead

of

Court Sponsored Mediation of Divorce, Custody, Visitation, and Support:
Winter 1989, 25, Fn 6; Ellen Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms In

An Argument for Inclusion,

369, 393 (1985); Ellen

encourages

St. Ct. J.,

'^ Ellen Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms
Soc.Pol'y&L. 87, 93(1993).
'^

and

spouses

The mediation process promotes

Va.

J.

Soc. Pol'y

& L.

In Divorce Mediation,

87, 88 (1993).

An Argument for

Inclusion, Va.

J.

Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 8 Fam. L. Q.
Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms In Divorce Mediation, An Argument for

Soc. Pol'y

& L.

87,

Nancy lllman Meyers, Power

94 (1993).

(Im) Balance

And The

Failure

Of Impartiality

In Attorney

-

Mediated

Divorce, 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 853, 856 (1996).
'7

Id

at

855;

KENNETH KRESSEL, THE PROCESS OF DIVORCE: HOW PROFESSIONALS AND

COUPLES NEGOTIA TE SETTLEMENTS,

1

43

(

1

985).

5

confrontation J 8

The adversary process
^^

one minus for me" and vice versa.

is

rather a "zero

-

sum game, one

The mediation process however

assumption that the marital pie can be enlarged: One plus for

me

plus for you,
is

is

based on the

can be one plus for

you, too. For example, in child custody cases, in which parents mediate cooperatively

and reach a
well

-

fair solution,

fair

outcome which promotes the

child's

In the mediation process the mediator assumes the parties take their lives

being.

into their

they benefit from this

own hands and

are able to tailor an arrangement that

fits their

personal needs

and allows creative problem solving.
the

In

traditional

adversarial

attorneys are the key figures,

model

who communicate

settlement rather than the parties^O

who

is

adversarial

negotiation)

with each other and negotiate a

are affected

process the judge makes a decision which

or

(litigation

by the outcome. In the

litigation

based on "normative predictions"

21

and

not adapted to the special needs and circumstances of divorcing couples. Because of
litigation's adversarial nature the

to reach a long

-

"wirmer gets

and "loser loses

all"

lawyers focus on winning the

lasting solution that is fair
all" mentality,

likely to enforce the polarization

is

a hostile and non

-

cooperative

and satisfying

game

rather than trying

to both parties.22 This

based on maximizing their

own

victory

between the divorcing partners, which are already

mood by

in

nature of the divorce situation, with which they

Id at 855; Daniel J. Guttman, For Better or Worse. Till ADR Do Us Part: Using Antenuptial
Agreements To Compel Alternatives To Traditional Adversarial Litigation, 12 Ohio St. on Disp. Resol.
18

175, 176 (1996);

Lynn A. Kerbeshian, ADR: To Be

Or...?,

Stipanowich, The Quiet Revolution comes to Kentucky:
J.

70 N.D.L.Rev. 381, 386 (1994); Thomas

A Case Study

in

Community Mediation,

J.

81 Ky. L.

855, 870(1993).

'"

Carrie

Solving

Menkel - Meadow, Toward Another View Of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem

UCLA Law

Review, Vol. 31:754, 765 (1984).

2" Nancy Illman Meyers, Power (Im) Balance And The Failure Of Impartiality In Attorney
Divorce, 27 U.Tol.L. Rev. 853, 856 (1996).
21 Id. at
855; Steven C.

Bowman, Idaho 's Decision on Divorce

Mediation, 26

IDAHO

L.

-

REV.

Mediated

547, 549

-550(1990).
22 Carrie Menkel - Meadow, Toward Another View
Of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 31: 754, 765 (1984).

6
are confronted. 23

The

basic assumption behind this adversarial concept

that both

is

divorcing parties have exactly the same goals, values, and interests and that a conflict

over the division of these limited resources

When

is inevitable.^"^

negotiating or litigating the issues of divorcing couples, lawyers and

parties in the adversarial

model

typically focus

on one issue

custody, maintenance or property division; consequently they
issues with

more than one problem

to solve.

at

fail to

a time,

e.g.,

child

master polycentric

Because of the underlying assumption of

the adversarial model, that the resources of the divorcing couple are limited, parties tend
to take

extreme positions during the negotiations, which leads to a polarization of

positions, with

adversarial

no opportunity

model intimidates

aggressive and one

-

to

develop creative alternatives to complex issues. The

parties,

who

principally

would

like to cooperate,

sided approach to find a solution. Consequently,

it

by

its

leads to

increased hostility and suspicion and fails to result in an agreement satisfactory to both
parties. 25 In divorce litigation, the strict rules

of

civil

procedure, which narrow the

issues and outcome, are a far too formal approach to issues as

complex as dissolving a

marriage, and therefore increase the social distance between judge and litigating
spouses. 26

The mediator, on

the other hand, accepts that individuals have their

and standards which influence

their decision.27

It

own

values

not the task and the aim of the

is

mediator to reconcile adverse positions; rather the mediator promotes the discussion and

23 Terenia Urban Guill,

A Framework For Understanding And Using ADR,

71 Tul. L. Rev. 1313, 1323

(1997).

2^ Carrie Menkel - Meadow, Toward Another View
Solving,

UCLA Law Review,

Of Legal

Negotiation: The Structure of Problem

Vol. 31:754, 765 (1984).

25/^.

2" Nancy Illman Meyers, Power (Im) Balance
Divorce, 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 853, 856 -58 (1996).

And The

Failure

Of Impartiality

In Attorney- Mediated

7

agreement by creating a "supportive atmosphere", "classifying issues", "helping

to

define the areas of conflict" and "helping to develop options for mutual agreement
together with the parties. "^8

Consequently, he rarely considers the conflict presented to him as a zero

game, but rather as a conflict with an open end, a pie
enlarged for both parties. ^9 The mediator
parties, in contrast to

Because

at

least

sum

can be

that is not yet fixed, but

not the representative of the mediating

an attorney in the traditional adversarial negotiation or

in the adversary process

enemies or

is

-

litigation.

spouses in a divorce situation are considered to be

opponents, this process

increases

hostility

between them.^^

Mediation, however focuses on the future relationship between the divorced couple and
a possible reconciliation rather than on the past behavior and misunderstandings

between the spouses. The role of emotions
than in the litigation process. Mediation
is

is

in

mediation

is

considerably more important

a "measure of emotional catharsis",

^

•

which

prohibited by the "procedural formality" of the traditional litigation process. In

mediation the primary goal

is

to

reconcile emotions by providing a "therapeutic

approach" to the settlement discussions, however, without being marriage counseling.^^

Emotions can be expressed and
problems in

their relationship. ^3

among

family

28

856; Stephen K. Erickson,

29

Id. at

Id.;

John

S.

members

parties are invited to

Non

legal issues like

-

work on personnel

promotion of communication^'*

are important goals in family mediation,

ADR And Family Law,

Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward

F.

issues and

12 Hamline

J.

which should help

Pub. L.

Sherman, Processes

to

& Pol'y 5, 6 (1991).

Of Dispute

Resolution^ 117

(1996).

30
3'

/J.

Nancy Illman Meyers, Power

(Im) Balance

And The

Failure

Of Impartiality

In Attorney

- Mediated

Divorce. 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 853, 857 (1996).

32 John
33/^.

34

m

S.

Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward

F.

Sherman, Processes

Of Dispute

Resolution, 297 (1996).

8

resolve the complex issues of child custody, property division, maintenance, alimony,

and future relationship

in a

smooth and open way, as well

as help to tailor a flexible and

individual solution to the parties' needs. ^5

35 Joel M. Douglas, Lynn

J. Maier, Bringing The Parties Apart, 49 SEP Disp.Resol.J. 29 (1994); Carrie
Menkel -Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes Of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute
Professionals, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1871, 1872 (1997).

CHAPTER II
THE MEDIA TION PROCESS

The

mediator

starts

the

between

discussion

the

divorcing

with

couple

introductory remarks on the ahemative character of mediation,^^ the goals of this
process, the procedure to reach a settlement, the confidentiality issues and the costs of
this dispute resolution process.

which have

to

Furthermore he familiarizes the parties with basic

rules,

be accepted by them throughout the discussions and ensures his neutrality

as a mediator.^^

The

parties begin the mediation process

marital problems from their personal point of

solve these issues. ^8
is

The

by defining and describing the post -

view and

finally

by

setting an

agenda to

task of the mediator at the beginning of the mediation session

to gather all information necessary for

him

to provide the parties with the assistance

they need to reach an agreement. The discussions cover the reasons for the conflict, and

provide an opportunity to vent anger and frustration;^^ in addition the mediator helps

complex post

the parties to develop options to resolve

-

marital issues.

After defining the issues parties analyze individual and
needs, as well as the issues that can be resolved by a

have to give

^" John

S.

^

'

38

John
/cy.

39/^.

40

m

at

S.

S.

Rau,

&

111-7-9 (National

Edward

F.

compromise and others

and

that they

Sherman, Dispute Resolution: Materials for Continuing

Institute for

Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward

302.

F.

interests

However, the divorcing couple alone decides

up'^O or at least postpone.

Murray, Alan

Legal Education

common

Dispute Resolution (1991)).

Sherman. Processes

Of Dispute

Resolution {\996).

10

which issues are most important
to resolve these issues

The next
alternatives

mediator

and

each of them and discusses whether they can commit

with mutual agreement."*'

them

step for

possibilities

stage

this

at

to

is

is

to

develop problem

of compromises
to

facilitate

communication, encourage the parties to lead a
to assist

them

in bargaining

cons of the various
divorce cases and
solution,

which

A)

1)

is

and negotiating a

solutions.'*^

may

The mediator can

difficulties

debate about the issues

at

hand, and

agreement by exploring the pros and
profit fi-om his experience with other

issue,

such

as,

e.g., child

The couple

post

-

to Settlement^"*

to Settlement requires the

mediator to fraction a

marital situation into several sub

-

issues,

which are

custody, maintenance, alimony, property division, fijture

tries to find

a solution to each sub

-

issue

and

in case they

cannot reach an agreement, the mediator simply draws their attention to another sub
issue

which might be

couple can handle complex issues easier

when

prevent a blockade in discussion."*^ Especially

42

this settlement

when mediating

Id.

44 Christopher W. Moore, The Mediation Process, 204 206, 212-216 (1986).
306.

is

that the

parties can participate in

43 Id

id. at

approach

they are separated and disconnected to

Id.

45 Moore,

-

easier to deal with.

The reason why mediators frequently use

41

in

settlement approaches in mediation

The Building Block Approach

relationship etc.

of the

responsive to their individual needs.'*^

The Building Block Approach

more manageable,

smooth

role

help the couple to discover their individual resources to tailor a

Two common

complex main

The

issues.

discussion,

fair

final

solving options, discover

complex

to

the

-

11

dividing the main issue and defining the sub

-

issues, the

mediator can promote their

understanding of the settlement process and therefore more commitment to

At the end, the several sub - issues or "blocks"
solution are

summed up

to a

to

which

it.'*^

parties could find a

whole settlement agreement, which can be drafted and

executed.

The Agreement

2)

in Principle

Approach

The second common approach
Approach

to

to Settlements^

settlement,

to

the

Agreement

in

Principle

Settlement requires the mediator to define bargaining principles and

general rules that will help to shape the final outcome in mediation.'*^ Instead of
fractioning a

main

issue into smaller sub

attention to their similarities
later

works on the

and

common

-

issues, the

mediator

first

draws

parties'

interests, rather than their differences

specific details.^^ Especially in cases, in

and

which divorcing couples

have the same basic values and goals, the focus on similarities can be effective and

promote a successful discussion.^^

By

using several

settlement procedures

during the mediation process the

mediator can include the parties into the process of option generation and separate this
stage of discussion fi-om the final stage of evaluating the agreement reached by the
parties.^

1

The advantage of this separation

reflect all options

and alternatives

is

that parties

have

to

open

47

Id.
Id. at

307.

48 Id
49 Id
50 Id
51 Id at 307 /308.

52 Id

at

308.

minds and

that could settle their conflict without blocking the

mediation process by hasty judgments and rejections of alternatives. ^^

46

their

12

Common

B)

Techniques for Option

-

Generation

The most frequent techniques mediators use

to generate options for settlement

are Brainstorming, Developing Hypothetical Plausible Scenarios, and

Using Outside

Resources. ^^

1)

Brainstorming

Brainstorming

is

a settlement procedure in which the mediator presents an

unsolved issue as a problem and asks the couple

might

look.^"^

The

how

a possible solution to this problem

parties then suggest a variety of alternative options,

modify and

develop the suggestions of the other spouse and try to work on these ideas as long as
they can agree to a compromise solution.^^

Brainstorming can be conducted in a joint session of both spouses, but also in

caucus with the mediator

if

both spouses don't trust each other or feel insecure to

openly discuss alternatives that they
order not to disclose too

2)

much

first

only want to communicate to the mediator in

information^^ to the other spouse.

Developing Hypothetical Plausible Scenarios

By

developing hypothetical scenarios the mediator asks the spouses to suggest

options for settlement by describing possible hypothetical scenarios and what the
solution of a problem in practice could look like.^^ Parties have to analyze in detail,

what the "procedural, substantive, and psychological outcome" of the process would be
and

how

the spouses could master the

situation.^^ After the parties

53

Id. at

308/ 09.

54

Id. at

308.

55/^.

56 Id

at

308.

57 Id

at

309.

58/^.

way from

the status

- quo

to the hypothetical

have brainstormed about the effects of each scenario, they

13

begin to evaluate these outcomes by
alternatives to

3)

improve

this

listing the

pros and cons as well as possible

outcome. ^^

Using Outside Resources

Using outside resources

another successful means to focus parties' attention

is

on possible settlement options. Parties
subjective

view of

The mediator

their

in

mediation are often frustrated by the

problems and lack objective data

to generate

more

options. ^^

can encourage them to use outside resources,

in these situations

e.g.,

information by other experts, special literature on divorce issues, or simply to get in

touch with other divorced couples

who had

the

same

financial, custodial, or other post

-

divorce issues to solve.^^ Attorneys, tax experts, and governmental officials can provide
additional useful information. ^2 Eventually the mediator assists the parties in writing

the final agreement and often helps
In

summary, the mediator

particular interests

them
is

in executing it.^^

a neutral third party and not an advocate of

and goals. Therefore, he can help

in a conflict relationship.

He

to

change the usual social pattern

persuades the parties to give up extreme and unrealistic

goals and to cooperate instead of confi-onting the other side with extreme positions and
therefore provoke severe opposition and hostility.^"*

Unlike a litigated process or an attorney
the final decision

on the outcome up

to the parties,

conditions agreed upon in the final settlement.

59

60
61

Id.

Id.

Mat 3 10.

62 Id
63

Mat 309/3 10.

64 Id

at

307.

-

led negotiation, the mediator leaves

who have

to adapt their lives to the

CHAPTER in

POWER IMBALANCE AND THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE

A) Power Imbalance

in

Inequality in bargaining

Divorce Cases - a General Overview

power normally leads

outcome. ^^ The central question, however,

is

to inequality in the

to analyze

what

is

mediated

power and how

it

is

defined.

"Power held by one spouse

in relation to the other represents the ability to

control resources, or the access to resources, that the other (spouse) wants or needs. "^^

Or

in other

words power

is

"the possibility of imposing one's will

upon

the behavior of

other persons".^^ Feminist critique on the mediation process in divorce cases

is

based

on two potential dangers

for the less powerful spouse.

of by the

economically or emotionally stronger spouse,^^ the second

intellectually,

the danger of a strong and prejudiced mediator

who

The

first is to

be taken advantage
is

defines his role as a neutral third

party but dominates the mediation process and imposes his

own

values on the spouse

with less self confidence, which according to these feminist critiques often happens to

be the female spouse.^^

"^ Scott Hughes, Elizabeth's Story: Exploring Power Imbalance In Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 553, 579(1995).

66 Hughes, id
67

at

574.

MAX WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 323

(

1

954).

6o Richard

Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative
Dispute Resolution, Wis. L. Rev. 1359, 1398 (1985); Ellen Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms In
Divorce Mediation: An Argument for Inclusion, 1 Va.J.Soc. Pol'y
L. 87, 116 (1993).

&

6^ Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody
Decisionmaking, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 727, 765 - 68 (1988); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
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The

powers

different

emotional and

in a relationship are intellectual, physical,

procedural power.^^ Emotional power in a relationship means "the ability to control the

The more

other partner through threats or intimidation".^'

the threatened spouse

is

unwilling to withdraw from the destructive influence and dissolve the relationship, the

more

and intimidation can become. The procedural power,

significant the threats

according to feminist

critics,

the length of a dispute, and

enables the more powerful spouse to control the process,
its

settlements^ ^y deciding on the evaluations and the

timing of the settlement process. ^^

The focus of

the mediator in this situation of serious inequality in bargaining

power, therefore, must be on the possibilities to smooth these differences and prevent
seriously unequal outcomes. In the traditional adversarial process this issue

by procedural principles and

rules,

e.g.,

"the burden of

proof and

is

the

resolved
"rules

of

evidence", which can shift and balance power between unequally powerful parties^"*

The ways

the neutral third party can effectively tackle this issue

empower

advantages of the mediation process to
process with

its

open discussions but firm ground

Process Dangers for Women, 100 Yale L.

Where Have The
'70

John R.

POWER

150,

P.

French,

155-56

Jr.

&

"72

Scott Hughes,
Id. at

mutual respect

is

especially

1545,1560 - 62, 1569-72 (1991); Eric Yamamoto,
L. Rev. 1055, 1058-60 (1996).

Bertram Raven, The Basis of Social Power,
M. Haynes, DIVORCE MEDIATION: A
277, 29 1

In Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo.
/J. at

explain the

weaker spouse. ^^ The mediation

rules of

(1959); John

THERAPISTS AND COUNSELORS 49,
"7'

J.

Gone? 36 Santa Clara

Critics

Power Imbalance

the

is to

- 93

J.

( 1

98

1

);

ADR:

in STUDIES IN SOCIAL
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR

Scott Hughes, Elizabeth

's

Story: Exploring

Legal Ethics 553, 575 (1995).

573.

575.

73 Id
"^^

Terenia Urban Guill,

A Framework For

Understanding

And

Using ADR, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 1313, 1325

(1997).
'^ Albie

M. Davis, Richard A. Salem, Dealing with Power Imbalances in the Mediation of Interpersonal
MEDIATION QUARTERLY, No. 6 at 17-26 (December 1984) (10 pp.), taken from American
Bar Association, Family Law Section Special Committee on Dispute Resolution, DIVORCE

Disputes.
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171, 172

ABA (1985).
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suited in cases of severe

power imbaiance.^^

In these situations the mediator can

model

the behavior he expects from the couple by listening carefully, treating each spouse with
respect,

and considering carefully of what each party has

process. This atmosphere

empowers

to contribute to the mediation

the spouse with a lower self esteem by respecting

her dignity 7^ Furthermore the mediator has to remind the parties to use their
intellectual capacity in evaluating the quality

judgment of a lawyer or the judge

in a court

own

of an agreement, rather than relying on the
-

litigation.

Thereby the weaker spouse

is

challenged to overcome her feelings of powerlessness and to take responsibility for her

own

future. ^^

The power imbalance between spouses, however, does not
unequal outcome, as long as the more powerful spouse

is

necessarily lead to an

ready to refrain from taking

advantage of the weaker spouse.^^ The motives for this altruism of the sfronger spouse

might be the

interest in a

good long

children. In this situation the

-

term relationship with his former partner and his

power imbalance

is

not reflected in the final outcome of

mediation, but remains merely theoretical. ^^
In the majority of cases, however, the

more powerful spouse

exerts his influence

during the mediation process and finally reaches a settlement which mirrors the
inequality in bargaining power.^'

divided,

the

more balanced

the

The more equally
mediation

process

the

power between spouses

and

final

outcome

will

is

be.

76/^.
Illd.
"^^

Id at 113.

'^ Scott Hughes, Elizabeth
Ethics, 553,

80

Id. at

's

Story: Exploring

Power Imbalances In Divorce Mediation,

8 Geo.

J.

Legal

578(1995).

578.

°' Id; Kelly

Rowe, The Limits Of The Neighborhood Justice Center: Why Domestic Violence Cases
Should Not Be Mediated. Emory L. J. 855, 861-63 (1985).
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Consequently the lack of a mechanism

in

mediation to balance the unequal power

normally disfavors the weaker spouse. ^2

To sum up

the critique of feminist on the mediation process in divorce cases,

these authors assume that Alternative Dispute Resolution
traditional adversarial

balanced. ^3

The

who can

if the

bargaining power of a divorcing couple

traditional divorce litigation, with its strict application

and substantive law,
spouse

model only

a fair alternative to the

is

is

is

of procedural

considered to be a highly necessary protection of the weaker

which the

easily be taken advantage of in the mediation process, in

neutral third party normally does not interfere in the discussion of the divorcing couple,
in order to enable

them

to

make

their

own

decisions. In a litigated process, according to

these feminist commentators, the weaker spouse
attorney,

judge

who

is

would get

fiill

protection by her

necessarily partial and supportive, as well as the protection of a neutral

who makes

on a normative

his decision based

basis,

and not according

to the

expression of power by the stronger spouse.

B) The Challenges in Mediating Divorce Cases

Commentators often assume
effectively the emotional, financial,

a marriage.^'*

The protection of

that divorcing

couples are not able to tackle

and psychological problems linked with dissolving

one's

own

interests

demands a

trained to deal with problems in an effective and sovereign way.

personality

However, as a

of abuse, inexperience",^^ and consequentially lack of self confidence,
for

82

women to

Id. at

define and protect

577; Gary L. Welton,

83 Steven C.

own

Power Balancing,

"result

often hard

105, 106 (1991).

Mediation, 26 Idaho L. Rev. 547, 559 (1989).

°^ Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth's Story: Exploring Power Imbalances
Legal Ethics 553, 562-63 (1995).

-26(1997).

it is

is

positions and interests.

Bowman, Idaho's Decision On Divorce

85 Terenia Urban Guill,

which

in

Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo.

A Framework For Understanding And Using ADR,

J.

71 Tul. L. Rev. 1313, 1323
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1)

Mediation

in divorce cases

Well - known feminists
mediation

is

by

assumption that both parties

women

power.^^

Women,

disadvantaged

Trina Grillo and Penelope Bryan assume

nature a threat to divorcing

its

in reality

like

and the inequality of bargaining power

start the

women, because

it

that

based on the

is

mediation discussions with equal power whereas

are permanently disfavored and therefore have no equal bargaining

according to these

against

feminist

critics

of divorce mediation, are

male spouses psychologically,

their

socially,

legally,

and

financially. 8^
a) Psychologically

less

convinced

women

in divorce situations are considered to

to reach a solution to their post

adversarial conflict resolution, and

more

likely to

-

marital problems by a tough and

compromise because of a lower

esteem.^^ Frequently, due to this lower self esteem
achieving"

aims and especially

their

abused

be depressive,

women

wives

are

self

in general tend to "fear

emotionally

completely

dependent on their husbands. ^^
b) Other reasons

why women

are frequently disfavored in negotiations are

differences in education, traditional roles, ^^ and socialization. ^^
Intellectual

negotiation.

Even

skills

if

and educational background determine the outcome of a

normally

men and women

tend to marry a partner with a similar

educational background, in marriages with unequally educated spouses

men

usually

^^ Carol Lefcourt, Women, Mediation and Family Lmv, 18 Clearinghouse Rev. 267-69 (1984); Ellen
Waldman, The Role Of Legal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion, 1 Va.J.Soc.

Pol'y&L.

87, 115

-

19(1993).

°' Penelope Bryan, The Coercion of

Women

In Divorce Settlement Negotiation,

Denver University Law

Review, Vol. 74:4, 931 (1997).
88 Id

at

933.

M. Laurie Leitch, The Politics of Compromise: A Feminist Perspective on Mediation, Mediation
Winter 1986/ Spring 1987, 163, 169; Ellen Waldman, The Role Of Legal Norms In Divorce
Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion, 1 Va.J.Soc. Pol'y «& L. 87, 1 16 -19 (1993).
Id.;

Q.,

91 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice 10-11 (1982); Ellen

Waldman, id

at

1

17.

19

have a superior education. ^2

^

higher education of the male spouse, especially in a

relevant field like legal rights and tax law,

and business people

which

is

accessible for lawyers, consultants

in general, but also basic educational

training in negotiation,

accessible for salesperson, provides the spouse with a higher chance to get the bigger

piece of the marital pie.

Because men have greater access
negotiation

game during

mediation.^^

dependency of husbands on

7^^ probable emotional and psychological

their wives,

which provides the female spouse with a

certain security of loyalty during the marriage loses

process.

relevancy during the divorce

its

The power which might have been equal during marriage

clearly shifts to the

normally win the

to tangible resources, they

husband who can dominate the ex

in a divorce situation

spouse in negotiating divorce

-

issues.

Socially

women

are caregivers to children

from the very beginning of

Women

normally

define their role

try to

and husband;

their marriage the tasks

of self

-

means they have

that

sacrifice

and service. ^^^

approach conflicts by cooperation and communication;^^ they

more from

exterior circumstances, e.g., the relations to other family

members, fiiends and colleges

etc.,

than by an interior definition of themselves as

individuals. 96 Their bargaining pattern, therefore,

is

92 Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us

And The

Softly:

Divorce Mediation

basically cooperative and altruistic,

Politics

Of Power. 40

Buff. L. Rev.

441,451 (1992).

9^ Penelope E. Bryan, The Coercion

Law Review,

Of Women

Vol. 74: 4, 931, 933 (1997);

in

Divorce Settlement Negotiation, Denver University

M. Laurie

Leitch,

The Politics of Compromise: A Feminist
Waldman, The Role

Perspective on Mediation. Mediation Q., Winter 1986/Spring 1987, 163, 169; Ellen

Of Legal Norms

In Divorce Mediation:

An Argument For

Inclusion,

1

Va.

J.

Soc. Pol'y

&

L. 87,

1

18

-

20

(1993).

95 Deborah M. Kolb

& Gloria G.

Coolidge, Her Place at the Table:

Negotiation, in Negotiation Theory

96 Deborah M. Kolb

& Gloria G.

and Practice, 261, 266

Coolidge, id

at

A

Consideration of Gender Issues in

(1991); Ellen

264 (1991).

Waldman,

id.

at 115.
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men

focused more on joint than on "individual success",^^ whereas

and "competitive",^^ demanding and

"individualistic"

Another reason why
negotiate

women

their strong desire to

is

c)

Some

child custody

outcome

in

be

assertive.

in a divorce situation are

keep custody of

mothers, used to the role of caregivers,

tend to

handicapped

their children,

which

to freely

most

for

of vital importance for their self definition.^^

is

feminists even argue that divorce law, in special circumstances where

is at

stake,

can become unfavorable for every

woman trying

a negotiation with her spouse. The custody law of most

states,

to reach a fair

with

its

vague

"best interest of the child" criteria for deciding custody issues and the lack of sufficient

and detailed

statutes in child custody law, leaves a lot

of space for clever husbands

to

pursue high financial interests in a divorce situation and, advised by their legal experts,
to offer

an exchange of child custody for more financial concessions by their wives. '^^
Furthermore the indefinite statutes on spousal maintenance law and the rhetoric

of "formal equality" of men and
in the

women

in

domestic relations pervades divorce law and

end favors men, who usually are already

normally

is

it

the

in a better

husband who earns the money or

at least

economic

position. ^^^ Since

has a higher income than his

wife, fi-equently only he can afford to pay those highly specialized and excellent lawyers

who

are best familiar with the advantages

to achieve the best financial

d)
situations

^"7

Kolb
Ellen

Another reason
-

outcome

and deficiencies of family law and know

in a divorce negotiation.

why most women need

an attorney and not a mediator

& Coolidge,

id.

at

how

-

is

a partial

their lack

counselor in divorce

of financial

know how and

269.

Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms
& L. 87, 1 16 - 20 (1993).

in

Divorce Mediation:

An Argument for Inclusion,

1

Va.

J.

Soc. Pol'y

"^ Penelope E. Bryan, The Coercion
of Women In Divorce Negotiation, Denver University
Vol. 74:4, 931,933(1997).
100

y^.

101 Id

Law Review,

21
consequently their long term financial interests J^^ Especially

among low income

spouses, the financial responsibility and control of the income are often in the hand of

more than

the male spouse and

in

women

any other social group

low

in

-

income

marriages lack basic financial knowledge. Therefore they can be easily taken advantage

of in negotiations with

their

husbands J ^^

e) Closely related to the lack

still

of financial knowledge

is

the fact that most

lack financial independence due to their lives as housewives. 'O'* Financially wives

and children are often dependent on the male spouse. Due to the

women

personal income,

security

which would enable them

phenomenon of "starving
for the

husband

wives have

is

Soc. Pol'y

^^^

Desmond

87,

Ellis,

1

18

-

till

in

of a

lower social classes lack financial

a satisfactory outcome

is

reached. '"^^ This

female spouse to reach a better financial outcome

in divorce negotiation

to deal with during the

& L.

women

to wait

out'''^^ the

widespread

^^2 Ellen Waldman, The Role

ft^equent lack

are often ready to agree to whatever settlement suggestion the

divorcing husband makes. Frequently

J.

women

and

intensifies the difficulties

mediation session.

Of Legal Norms

In Divorce Mediation:

An Argument For

Inclusion,

1

Va.

J.

3 17

19 (1993).

Marital Conflict Mediation

and Post - Separation Wife Abuse,

8

Law

&

Ineq.

(1990).

^"^ M. Laurie Leitch, The Politics of Compromise:
Winter 1986/ Spring 1987, at 163, 169.

A

Feminist Perspective on Mediation, Mediation Q.

Penelope E. Bryan, The Coercion Of Women in Divorce Negotiation, Denver University Law
Review, Vol. 74:4, 931 (1997); Howard S. Erlanger et al.. Participation and Flexibility in Informal
Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 Law & Soc'y Rev. 585, 597 (1987); Ellen Waldman,
77?^

Role

Of Legal Norms

In Divorce Mediation:

An Argument for

Inclusion,

1

Va.

J.

Soc. Pol'y L. 87,

119(1993).
'"" Penelope E. Bryan, The Coercion
Vol. 74:4,931(1997).

Of Women

in

Divorce Negotation, Denver University

Law Review,
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2)

Power

as the access to tangible and intangible resources

Power, according
to tangible

to

some

feminist critics of mediation,

and intangible resources. '^^ According

to

them,

is

men

defined as the access

usually have the better

access to tangible resources as income, education, and profession, '^^ as well

as

intangible resources as status and dominance, resulting from a higher self confidence

and

self respect. '^^

a) Tangible

Resources

The most important

tangible resource of "income" enables the spouse with the

higher income to hire better experts

who can

tailor

an agreement adapted to his interests

only. This spouse has the opportunity to very easily

maximize

by diminishing the one of the other spouse. The general
by

far higher

married

women have no

fall

is

earnings at

most

all.'

women

women would

that

men have

50%

of the

^^

define themselves as mothers and caretakers, they

victims to "strategic bargaining".

the majority of

of the marital pie

that in the U.S.

incomes than women, performing the same job, and

Finally, because

often

rule

his part

'

' ^

willingly give

Husbands,

up other

who

are

aware of the

interests if they

fact that

can keep child

custody, often take advantage of their ex wives and successfully reduce the

amount of

child support and maintenance for "giving up" joint or sole custody.^ ^2 f^is scenario,

according to feminists

'0*7

who

refuse mediation,

is

unlikely to occur in the traditional

Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation

And The

Politics

Of Power, 40

Buff. L.

Rev. 441,447 (1992).

108

m

109/^.

^^^Id

at

447;

JEAN LIPMAN-BLUMEN, GENDER ROLES AND POWER

163 (1984).

'
1 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through
Negotiation: Dispute - Settlement and Rulemaking,
89 Harv. L. Rev. 637, 638 (1976); Ellen Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms in Divorce Mediation: An
Argument for Inclusionm. Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 1 19 - 20 (1993).

'

12 Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody

Yale L.

& Pol'y Rev.

168, 177(1984).

and

the

Dynamics of Greed,

3
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which the "best

adversarial process in

interest

of the child"

is

frequently interpreted as

child custody for the mother.' ^^ Another group of feminists, however, refuses this
criteria as

vague and disfavoring women.'

''^

b) Intangible Resources

Among

the intangible resources "status and

dominance" as positive resources

and
"depression" as negative resource have the most powerful impact on the divorce
negotiation itself and finally on the fairness of the outcome.' '^

Some

intangible factors differ in each individual marriage, but not between

husbands and wives

in general, e.g., intangible factors like guilt

because of being the

one who suggested the break up, lack of self esteem caused by rejection and "risk
aversiveness"."^ However, other intangible factors do differ between husbands and

wives in general and determine the

final

The male spouse usually has

outcome of the divorce negotiation.

a higher status than his wife, defined

by a

better

educational and financial background as well as his gender and "occupational rank". ' ^
'

The higher

the status of a spouse, the

more persuasive

his authority, ' ' ^

and the better

and more subtle his influence on the weaker spouse."^ Women's usually lower
in society is partly

due

to the smaller percentage

"^ Lenore E. Walker, The Battered
Family Violence Research 3 1 42 - 43
,

^^^ See page 21/22 of this

Woman Syndrome
(

1

of women with a profession other than

Study, in The

116

441,457-71

Dark Side of Families: Current

983).

thesis.

115 Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation

Rev.

And The

Politics

Of Power, 40

(1992).

/J.

117W.
1

18 Alice H. Eagly,

ll^Eagly,

/^.

status

Gender and Social

Influence, 38

AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 971

(1983).

Buff. L.

-

24
housewife. The higher status of
negotiation partner while

The impact of

women

status

men

enables them to exert more influence on the

with their lesser status, are highly influenceable.'^O

on male behavior

behavior toward the other spouse.

On

is

measurable

in the extent

of dominant

the other hand, the usually lower status of

women

can cause a certain inferiority and inhibited reaction to an intimidating and dominant

approach of the male spouse during divorce negotiations.

^21

Depression The lower status of women, combined with depression in a divorce
:

situation leads to a lower self esteem in negotiation. This lack
finally

can lead to the acceptance of an highly one

to maintain

-

of proper self confidence

sided and unfavorable outcome, just

peace in an ongoing relationship. 22 j\iq sources of gaining more self
^

esteem and respect (society, profession and environment) normally are outside of

women's

daily life as housewives, except for the case,

to stay at

home

:

the goals and the aspiration the better normally

outcome of a negotiation. 124 Women, because of

the "structural and ideological inequality" ^ 25

husbands.

voluntarily prefer

with their families. ^^3

Reward Expectation The higher
the

when women

One reason

for this lack

qj^q

their

lower status in society and

generally satisfied with less than their

of high aspiration

is

the tendency of

women, based

120 Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us
Soflty: Divorce Mediation And The Politics Of Power. 40 Buff. L.
Rev. 441, 462 (1992); Alice H. Eagly, Sex Differences in Injluenceability, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 86 - 89
(1978); Alice H. Eagly, Gender
121 Penelope E. Bryan,

122

id. at

and Social Influence, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 971, 976 - 977
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465.
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123 /J at 47 1-77.
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AM. SOC. REV. 331, 332 (1983).

Evaluation Argument, 48

25

on

background, to compare themselves with other

their social

women

rather than to

men. 26
^

Fear of achievement

Although the mediation process by

:

nature

its

is

rather

cooperative than competitive, the distribution of limited resources can lead to a highly

competitive bargaining situation. ^ 27 in these situations, according to research,
tend to be more accommodative, and compromising;

instead

women

of using the same

competitive negotiation strategies as their husbands, they tend to apply "facilitative"
dispute resolution styles. '28
In the majority of cases the

more powerful spouse

exerts his influence during the

mediation process and finally reaches a settlement which mirrors the inequality in the

- husband and

bargaining power between ex

wife, '29 whereas equal

power usually

leads to fair outcomes. '^^

who

feminists

In contrast to the

criticize

the

present divorce

law for

its

disadvantages for women,' 3' another group of feminist focuses on the character of
litigation. '32

mediation as informal and outside of the traditional adversarial court
lack of an objective standard and control, measured by legal

126 Penelope E. Bryan,

at

id.

475
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MEDIA TION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS AND RESEARCHERS,
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judge as a neutral and powerful third person, would enable the stronger spouse to take
advantage of the unequal bargaining power. '33

These feminists argue
rights

that the mediation technique

and the acknowledgment of the "no

-

fault"

is

contradictory to

divorce:

'^^^

women's

While judges and

have recognized the importance of women's rights and are more and more

legislators

willing to change substantial and procedural law in favor of them, mediation by

nature as an alternative dispute resolution

mechanism and

method

sets

women

its

outside of this safety

intentionally disregards the parameters of legal rules. '^5

C) Power Imbalance and Mediation as a Solution

The feminist

critique

of mediation

is

justified in cases

of severe abuse only.

Frequently, mediation as the cooperative and reconciling approach to solve problems

helps to smooth

power imbalances by promoting communication of ideas and helping

parties to reduce tension

and

hostility. '^^

provided for the mediation process

itself,

The procedural

guidelines,

which

are often

can help to equalize the bargaining position of

every party by giving them equal chances to define the issues and to contribute to

problem

-

solving. ' 37

Some methods of

equalizing the

power imbalance

are to rearrange the seating

order to

prevent direct eye contact between the spouses, and to enable them just to have

eye

133

m

'34

Id.;

Carol Lefcourt, Women, Mediation

135Lefcourt,

/J.

and Family Law,

18 Clearinghouse Rev.

269 (1984).

at267-68.

'3o Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth's Story: Exploring Power
Imbalances In Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo.
Legal Ethics 553, 581 (1995).

137
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contact with the mediator. '^^

Another method
writes

down

is

to direct both parties to a blackboard

on which the mediator

the information they have gathered and reflects the progress the parties

have made. 13^ The mediation process can definitely become more equalized

if the

mediator meets with both parties separately in caucus, '"^^ and allows the weaker spouse
to express freely her fears, anger

and suspicion of unfairness. This approach has the

advantage to prevent the more powerful spouse from dominating the mediation process

by subtly or

clearly

making destructive comments. '"^^ Even

if the

effects

of these

mediation tools on the emotional power imbalance are often only temporary, as long as
the parties are under the supervision of a neutral mediator, they are in a

more or

less

equal position, and the intellectual and physical power imbalance can be diminished. '^2

However, the important "emotional " power imbalance
tackle because emotional fears,

which are deeply rooted

in

is far

more

difficult to

one spouse's personality

cannot be diminished in a short process. ^'^^ After the mediation session ends the spouses
with severely unequal power tend to assume the roles they had played before they
started mediating their marital problems.

Sometimes emotional

power imbalance, because

serious intellectual

the emotional blockade prevents the

weaker spouse from comprehending the information

138

Id,

at

579

SETTLEMENT, 40

81;

-

barriers also lead to a

to

which she has equal

access.

•'*'*

JOHN BLADES, FAMILY MEDIATION: COOPERATIVE DIVORCE

(1985).

•39 Scott H. Hughes,

id.

at

580.

^^^ Christopher W. Moore, The Caucus: Private Meetings That Promote Settlement, 16 Mediation
Q. 87,
89(1987).
''*'

Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth's Story: Exploring

Legal Ethics 553, 579

-

142 Scott H. Hughes, id
l'*^/^ at 581.

144/^ at

581.

Power Imbalances

80 (1995); Christopher Moore, id
at

581.

at

88-89.

In Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo.

J.
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Finally,

smooth long

it

is critical

even a mediator

to realize that

power imbalances and

lasting

that

it

is

limited in his abilities to

would be naive

to

assume

that

emotional equality between spouses can be achieved after emotional disturbances

caused by abuse and humiliation in the marital and post-marital relationship. '^^^

D) The Shift of Power
Whether economic, procedural,

intellectual or psychological

power,

it

is

rarely

constant and static throughout a relationship or throughout the divorce mediation, but
often shifts fi-om one party to the other. ^^^
Factors,
order, in

which influence the power

distribution

which they present the main issues

between the

in the divorce process

parties can be the

and

their personal

point of view on the problems involved. ''^^ Another important factor for the
distribution

among

the divorcing couple

parties' ethnic identification.!'*^

is

the sense of having been

is

the role of the mediator, and his and the

Another reason

wrong

power

in the past

why power

can

shift

and the burden of

during mediation

guilt or

simply the

deficiency in knowledge on a particular issue. ''^^

The power and
power

145

is

its

significant impact

on the other party depends largely on how

perceived and reacted upon by the other spouse as well as this spouse's

m
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al.,
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Ensuring Fairness

in
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awareness of his or her power.

^

5*^

Consequently, one efficient

way

for the

spouse to withdraw from the overwhelming power of the other spouse
perceive the

own

powerful resources and to use these resources

represent her

own

interests in the divorce

E) Limits of Mediation

in

to bring

to learn to

forward and

mediation process.

Divorce Cases

To avoid power imbalances
it is

is

weaker

that significantly contribute to

an unequal outcome,

necessary to exclude certain categories of cases from mediation. Statutes in several

concerning mediation and the limitations to

states

it

aim

at protecting parties

who

are

highly vulnerable and unable to resist pressure exerted either by the mediator or by the
other spouse. ^^1 Examples of these categories are victims of domestic violence, patients

of mental health illnesses, or people
Furthermore, people
their

own

suffered from substantial abuse.

are substantially inferior in bargaining and asserting

be excluded from the mediation program. ^^^ j]^q difficulties

interests should

in restricting mediation

who

who

by excluding these cases from the mediation process are

to

accurately predict whether a certain case involves a party susceptible to mediation

pressure or bargaining inferiority. ^^^

The

difficulties in

excluding domestic violence cases from the mediation process

even by statutes or court rules are diverse. The statutes aiming

at

excluding domestic

violence cases from mediation differentiate between "categorical prohibition", "case

'

^" Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth

's

Story: Exploring

Power Imbalances

in

Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo.

-

J.

LegalEthics, 553, 576(1995).
*^' Craig A.

Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers: Challenging The
Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1317, 1335 - 36
(1995).

'52 Ariz. Rev.

Guide
'^•'

to

Stat.

Ann.

s

25-381.23 (West 1991); Garry

J.

Friedman,

A Case Of Abuse.

221, 241

in:
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by case screening by the court" '^"^ and exclusion of the case by the judge,
claims

it

if a party

and has a special proofJ ^^

1)

Categorical Exclusion

Categorical exclusion of domestic violence cases from the mediation process
leads to an "underinclusion"'^^ of these cases, especially if these exclusions have to be

based on court pleadings only.^^^ Research of custody cases in Ohio and interviews
with couples in other states have shown that the percentage of people
violence had occurred in their marriage was

much

higher

who

when

admitted that

interviewed by

employees of the court than the percentage of people who alleged

it

in

court

pleadings. '5^

Procedural difficulties imposed by legislators to prevent an overexclusion of
cases from the mediation process for fear of a misuse lead to a further reduction of

divorce cases which could be excluded from the mediation process. ^^^ Examples of
these procedural hurdles are that a

mere

report of violence

exclusion of a violence case from mediation

is

is

not sufficient ^^0, or that an

possible only if parties falsely alleging

domestic violence are threatened by a penalty of perjury. '6' These substantial and

^^'^

Okla. R.

&

Proc. for Disp. Resol. Act app. A, reported in Okla. Stat. Ann.

tit.

12, s

37 app. (West

1993).

155 N.C. Gen.

Stat, s

50 - 13.1

© (Supp.

1994).
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procedural hurdles for an exclusion of domestic violence cases from the mediation
process enlarge the gap between the

number of actual violence cases and those excluded

from mediation. ^2
'

On
just

the other hand the categorical exclusion of cases from the mediation process

on the basis of a

party's statement

can lead to the other extreme of "overexclusion"

of cases from the mediation process J ^^ especially

in cases

where the presence and

assistance of lawyers can diminish the imbalance of power.

2) Individual

Case Assessment

The individual case assessment
divorce mediation. However,

it is

another possible means to balance power in

is

not only costly and likely to delay the divorce process

but also highly probable to cause either over

-

or underexclusion of cases from the

mediation process.'^"* In addition the individual case assessment suffers from the same
insufficiency as the "categorical exclusion", because

whether substantial bargaining inequality
the

it

is

highly difficult to predict

in the individual case will

cause inequality in

outcome of the process, '^^ even though usually unequal power leads

to

unequal

outcomes.
3) Issue Limitation

This approach to reduce power imbalance in divorce mediation

problem by separating economic from custodial
is

the assumption that linking

issues. '^^

YhQ reason

economic and custodial issues

in

tries to tackle the

for this separation

mediation can lead the

'^2 Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard

J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers: Challenging The
Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation, 1317, 1338 - 39 (1995).

163

Mat

1337.

164/^. at 1339.
'"^ Linda Girdner, Mediation Triage: Screening for Spouse Abuse in Divorce Mediation, 1 Mediation
Q.

365,376(1990).
16° Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard

Dominant Approaches

to

J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers: Challenging The
Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1317, 1340 (1995).
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more powerful parent

to ask for

more economic concessions before giving up

ciiild

custody in exchange. '^^By separating these two issues during mediation commentators

assume
critics

that this "trade

-

off'^^^ can be prevented. In addition to the separation of issues,

underline that parties

who

are less familiar with legal

issues can be taken

advantage of by the more informed, educated or experienced spouse. '^^

Some

states

have reacted

to this inappropriate link

by mandating mediation only

custodial issues

between economic issues and

for cases in

which child custody matters

or visitation issues are excluded. ^^^ Other states have reacted by

economic matters from the
program

rest

separating the

of divorce issues and by developing a special mediation

for the sensitive issues

of economic

interests

of spouses, which

is

led

by

attorney-mediators only.^^^

However

this "issue limitation"

approach to balance power cannot be considered

as an overall solution. '^^ First, the statutes separating custodial and
actually cannot prevent the parties

economic

issues

from linking them.^^^ In child custody cases

highly probable that mediation will, sooner or

later,

it

is

bring up the economic topic of

child support during child custody mediation. ^^'^

'"'

Ann

Milne, Mediation -

A Promising Alternative for Family

Courts, 1991 Juv. &. Fam.Cts.

J. 61,

68

(1991).

'"° Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers: Challenging The
Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1317, 1340 - 42
(1995).
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Other
joint custody

critics point

and the

out that the financial obligations involved

fact that often the

mediator and the parties wrongfully assume

equal financial obligations in joint custody cases
really separate these

^"^^

two

when deciding on

makes

it

doubtful whether you can

issues. '^^

Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers For Women. 100 Yale L.J. 1545, 1571

72(1991).

-

.

CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE OF LEGAL NORMS

As O.

J.

Coogler had already discovered in the beginning of the divorce

mediation movement, mediators should acquire basic legal knowledge, in addition to
their educational training in behavioral science. 1^^

Commentators on

expect mediators to have legal training on the

this issue often

issues of child support and maintenance, ^^ to provide divorcing couples with a
^

comparison

to the

outcome

have the proper information

have the

an adversarial court -

to decide

ftinction

litigation.

Consequently parties

whether in their individual case mediation

resolution method. ^^^

more favorable dispute
therefore,

in

is

the

Legal norms in divorce mediation,

of providing a measurement'^^ for the quality of the

mediated outcome and to give the parties a guideline for negotiating divorce issues.

Some commentators even
issues, trial practice
to

work with

insist

on a broader knowledge mediators should have on

and procedure, as well as

parties within the parameters

legal terminology, in order to enable

legal

them

of the legal system. '^^

'^^ O.J. Coogler, Structured Mediation in Divorce Settlement. 11 (1980).

John Allen Lemmon, Divorce Mediation: Optimal Scope and Practice

Issues,

Mediation Q.,

September 1983,45,48.
'

*

^^ Lemmon,
'^ Daniel G.

Cts. Rev.,

id. at

51

Brown, Divorce and Family Mediation: History, Review, Future Directions, Conciliation

December 1982,

*°^ Christopher

1,

23 (1982).

W. Moore, Training Mediators for Family Dispute

1983, at 79, 83-84.

34

Resolution^ Mediation Q.,

December
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Other commentators and practitioners underline the alternative character of
mediation to the court

The
their

get

problem

different

own

-

litigated process,

-

which

is

necessarily based on legal norms: '^^

solving approach in mediation, which allows parties to follow

perceptions of justice, instead of relying on a fixed assumption of

which

of the marital

part

pie, requires different guidelines than the legal

who

should

norms. The

American Bar Association (ABA) Family Law Section Standards of Practice for
Family Mediators^^^ provides guidelines

for divorce mediators to ensure that parties

have an appropriate base of legal information that can help them to

which

not beyond any "reasonable" standard. Furthermore,

is

end the process

if

a

fair

and reasonable outcome

in

it

mediation

tailor a solution

requires mediators to
is

unlikely. '^^

These

standards don't have the quality of statutes and therefore lack binding character, but

they are established to influence the mediators in their practical work. However, they
are heavily criticized by both commentators and mediators, ^^
'

to the alternative character

is

just

and

to

consider them threat

of mediation.

John Lande was one of the most profiled
According

who

him mediation

is

critics

of the

ABA

standards.

based on cooperation and a personal conception of what

Legal norms, however, are means to handle a conflict in a competing,

fair.^^^

adversarial dispute resolution like court litigated divorce. '^^ Mediation, according to

Lande,

based on the power and right of self

is

process itself

181

is

M

183id. Standard
1°'*

determination of each spouse. The

thereby the expression of the parties personal values and not an

'°2 ABA Family Law
L.Q. 455 (1984).

J.

-

Ellen

Section, Standards

IV©, V

of Practice for Family Mediators (1983), reprinted

& L.

87,

96

-

/Vy.

at 19.

In Divorce Mediation:

An Argument For
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99 (1993).
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186 Lande,
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at 40.
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objective

search

for

a

fair

outcome. '^^ Therefore the

mediators to terminate the process

if the

outcome obviously

the objectives underlying the mediation process.' ^^
justice" requires the

acknowledgment of

ABA
is

advising

standards,

unfair, are detrimental to

Lande maintains

that "substantive

and

parties' particular interests, purposes,'^^

philosophies of life, instead of imposing an objective system of values and prefabricated
"fair

outcome" on them.
Other commentators point out that

it is

unproductive to impose legal norms on

mediating spouses because they distract parties and mediators from the central issue of
the Alternative Dispute Resolution,

namely the difference

in

approach not only in the

process but also in the outcome of mediation. '^^

Another approach
this "instrumental

to evaluate the role

of legal norms

in

mediation denies even

value" of legal norms in divorce mediation. '^^ Commentators

appreciate the role of mediators as

mere

facilitators

who

of a discussion among divorcing

couples and the mediation process as the search for an agreement that reflects best both
parties

particular

needs and interests reject legal norms for their "arbitrary and

divisive" '^^character. Instead of allowing the parties to
tailor

meet

their personal

needs and

a specific and individual solution, legal norms would invite them to speculate over

a potential outcome in a subsequent litigation. '^^ In the adversarial process,

'^^ Lande,

/c/.

at 36.

'^^Lande,

id.

at37.

'"^ Nichol M. Schoenfield,
Turf Battles
in

Child Custody Disputes,

'"' Ellen

1

1

Ohio

St. J.

And Professional Biases: An Analysis Of Mediator
On Disp. Resol. 469, 474 - 75 (1996).

Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms
Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 96 - 99 (1993).
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lawyer

who communicates

to his client

mediation process the parties are their

what

own

is fair

according to the law, whereas

interpreters

of fairness. '^^

Other commentators point out that legal norms are too
solutions for

in the

static

and

rigid to offer

complex and multi -layered psychological concerns and other problems

the divorce process. '^^

A

complex system

like the family

in

cannot be analyzed and

intervened into by a strictly rational and logical legal concept '^^ but understood only

when

the mediator stops categorizing the problems into a prefabricated order.

As

another

critic

points out, the legal system

is

based on the perception that you

can achieve absolute justice and that for every wrong there

However, mediation represents the notion of
Justice

what the

is

parties perceive to

be

is

a just remedy. '^^

"situational or relational

just,

which

is

fairness" '^^

the notion of individually

perceived justice.

A

very free concept of mediation provides the mediator with the right to judge

whether and

According

how much of

to these

the legal system he wants to introduce to the parties. ^^^

commentators,

it is

up

to the

mediator in every individual case to

decide whether the knowledge of legal norms would be a facilitator in the discussion.

'^'*

Stephen K. Erickson, The Legal Dimension of Divorce Mediation,

in

Divorce Mediation: Theory and

Practice. 105-06(1988).

'"^ Robert D. Benjamin, The Physics
of Mediation: Reflections of Scientific Theory in Professional
Mediation Practice, 8 Mediation Q. 91-92 (1990).

196
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197 Benjamin,
198/^.

199

M

id.

at 102.
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A) The

Two

-

Tiered

ModepOO

-

Mediation as combination of legal and psychological help
This model

is

based on the assumption that divorcing parties not only need legal

advice in mediation, but that each spouse should seek legal counseling in addition to the
help provided within the mediation process.^O' The outside counsel does not assist each
party during the mediation session, but he counsels his clients after an agreement in

mediation

is

reached and provides him with the comparison between the mediated

outcome and a

potential subsequent court

-

litigated dispute.202 Attorneys, assisting

parties after the mediation process offer a final

check and "safety net"203 against being

taken advantage of by the other spouse or prejudiced mediators and thereby reduce the

danger of a seriously unequal outcome, that might tempt the "losing" spouse not to keep
her promise that she

Even though

made
the

in the

mediated settlement.204

involvement of attorneys

disputed, the basic idea of the

two

-

regulate mediation, e.g., the Standards

tiered

in the

mediation process

model appears

is

hotly

in different standards to

of the Association of Family and Conciliation

Courts (AFCC), the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the American Bar

^"^ Ellen Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion,
J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 99 - 101 (1993).
2^'

Id.;

Alison E. Gerencser, Family Mediation: Screening For Domestic Abuse, 23 Fla.

Mc Ewen & Nancy

43, 62 (1996); Craig

SP

-

RESOL.

St.

1

Va.

U. L. Rev.

H. Rogers, "Bring the Lawyers into Divorce Mediation", 101

-

Scott H. Hughes, Elizabeth's Story: Exploring Power Imbalances In Divorce
Legal Ethics 553, 594 - 95 (1995).

8 (1994);

Mediation, 8 Geo.

J.

202 Steven C. Bowman, Idaho's Decision On Divorce Mediation, 26 Idaho L. Rev. 547, 555 - 57
(1989); Russell M. Coombs, Noncourt - Connected Mediation and Counseling in Child - Custody
Disputes, 17 FAM. L. Q. 469, 471 (1984); Hugh Mclsaac, The Role of the Attorney in Resolving Custody
Disputes, Conciliation Cts. Rev.,

December 1988,

at 9, 12.

203 Ellen Waldman, The Role
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J.
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(ABA) Family Law Section standards

Association

up

set

family mediation

for

cases.205

The

AFCC

model standards of 1984 advise mediators

professional education and to

recommend

to

check the limits of their

to their clients additional legal help

by an

outside attorney. 206 Especially in cases in which legal rights and obligations might have

an impact on the outcome in mediation, mediators are asked to encourage their clients to
seek professional legal assistance prior to settling the issue.207 The

AAA

model

standards additionally encourage to lead legal discussions in a forum outside of the

mediation

program

itself

whenever

American Arbitration Association

in

problems

legal

its

arise.208

Consequently,

Family Mediation Rules supports the

the

Two

-

Tiered Model of an independent legal counsel outside of the mediation process itself.209

The most

detailed

model standards,

set

up by the

ABA

Family

Law

Section,

point out that parties should seek independent attorney assistance during the whole

mediation process, and not only
drafted.210

if legal

problems arise or an agreement has to be

The family and divorce mediators

clients seek professional legal help

especially before they agree to any

are encouraged to

recommend

that their

from the very beginning of a mediation process and

outcome

in the

mediation session.2

1

2"^ Ellen Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion,
J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 87, 102(1993).

1

Va.

20" Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce
Mediation, reprinted in Divorce Mediation: Theory and Practice, at 419 (1988).

207

m

208 American Arbitration Association, Family Mediation Rules.

209 American Arbitration Association, Family Mediation Rules. #
Bringing The Parties Apart, 49 - SEP Disp. Resol. J. 29, 33 (1994).

4; Joel

M. Douglas, Lymi

210 Ellen A. Waldman, The Role
Of Legal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For
Va.

J.

Soc. Pol'y

211/^.

&

L. 87,

103-107

(1993).
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This

Two

-

Tiered Model of mediation with an additional legal counseling has

been widely accepted

in the publications

and court

practice,2l3 as well as private^''*

outside counsel

is

on mediation2l2 and the public
-

institutional

xhe

affiliated^l^ mediation centers.216

considered to be a guarantee or

at least

a security

means

against

prejudiced, or inexperienced, or simply bad mediators and guarantees that every spouse
will

have a basic understanding of his or her legal rights and obligations before she

commits

to a

mediated long

The Two
is

-

-

term agreement.217

Tiered Model

the expression of parties'

is

based on the assumption that even though mediation

autonomy and control over

the settlement process, they

need, or at least should be advised to seek, legal assistance from an advocate
partial

and gives them advice based on the personal

Two

spouse.218 Thereby the

-

Tiered Model

tries

to

who

and goals of each

interests

combine the advantages of

mediation with the traditional adversarial negotiation model. The underlying idea

who

only a party

is

is

that

is

well informed about her legal rights and obligations can be an

autonomous and serious partner

term agreement

for mediating a long

in a cooperative

and problem solving way.

2 '2 Russell M. Coombs, Noncourt

IVFam.

L.

- Connected Mediation and Counseling

in

Child - Custody Disputes,

Q.469,489(1984).

^^^ Ellen A. Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion,
Va.J. Soc. Pol'y

&

L. 87, 103

- 107

2'^ Henry M. Elson, Setting Up a Private "Mediation" Practice,
Resolution, 73, 1 78 - 79 ( 982).
1

in

Alternative

Means of Family Dispute

1

2'^ James C. Melamed, New Oregon House Bill 2225, in
Family Dispute Resolution Options for All Ages 147, 149.

ABA

Standing Comm.

On

Dispute Resolution,

2*" Ellen A. Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion,
Va.J. Soc. Pol'y &. L. 87, 103 - 107 (1993).
2'

Thomas A. Bishop, The Standards of Practice for Family Mediators: An
and Comments. 17 Fam. L. Q. 46, 467-68 (1984);
'

Soc. Pol'y

&

L. 87,

103-107

(1993).

1

Individual Interpretation

2'° Ellen Waldman. The Role of Legal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument For Inclusion,
J.

1

(1993).

1
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However, the advantage of
point of criticism.

who have

is at

the role of attorneys in the

Commentators see

being the "watchdogs",219

combined model

this

the

same time a major

Two

to provide a guarantee against

consider this model as damaging to the reputation of mediators,

Tiered model as

-

bad mediators. They

who

should be well

trained to consider each party's rights without being partial. ^20 Mediators, according to
the critics, should be able to inform their clients about the basic legal
their case

and should not be encouraged

norms

to delegate responsibility for a fair

that affect

outcome

to

an outside legal counsel22l

B) Inclusion of Legal

Norms

into the

The "Inclusion of Legal Norms

Mediation Process

into the

Mediation Process" model

the assumption that mediators will acquire the basic

concepts necessary for them to provide a

fiilly

knowledge of

is

based on

legal rules

and

satisfactory service to the divorcing

couple. 222 Because mediator ftmctions range from gathering facts, and helping parties
to brainstorm

and work on potential solutions

parties' final agreement,223

to evaluating these options

and drafting of

mediators are better able to meet these demands

familiar with family law, precedent cases and procedural law.224

if

they are

xhe knowledge of tax

law, for example, can help the mediator to suggest a favorable property division or other

m
220 m
219

221

222

Id.

Id.

at

107;

Nancy

U.S.F.L. Rev. 665, 668

J.
-

Foster

&

Mediator Competence While Preserving Diversity, 30 U.

223 Jay Folberg

&

224

1

Va.

S. F. L.

Rev. 723, 738 - 739 (1996).

Alison Taylor, Mediation—A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflicts Without

Litigation 1 (1984); Ellen A.

For Inclusion.

Who Should Be Certified? 30
Of Certification: How To Ensure

Joan B. Kelly, Divorce Mediation:

69 (1996); Ellen A. Waldman, The Challenge

J.

Waldman, The Role Of Legal Norms In Divorce Mediation: An Argument

Soc. Pol'y &. L. 87, 107 (1993).

Id. at 107; Ellen A. Waldman, The Challenge Of Certification: How To Ensure Mediator
Competence While Preserving Diversity, 30 U. S. F. L. Rev. 723, 738 - 740 (1996).
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financial transactions. 225

By

exploring different options to divide the limited resources,

the couple can enlarge "the marital pie"226 and thereby reduce the financial burden that

both partners have to carry after divorce. The categorization of financial support decides

which tax law

will apply to the case.227 Furthermore, the decision

marital property

is

of

who

will

keep the

important for the capital gains taxes228 that will have to be paid by

the "favored" spouse. Especially in divorce cases,

where couples have highly disparate

incomes, the division and distribution of property and other financial resources can
seriously affect the tax consequences. 229

Regarding

non

financial

-

issues

in

divorce

cases,

such

as

custodial

arrangements, a mediator's knowledge of family law or of creative solutions that courts
or attorneys have suggested for frequent problems, can be of vital importance.230

The

classic dispute

between divorcing couples, the child custody

solved by suggesting different "levels of participation"23
in the upbringing

of the child.232 One option to

in the child's life is to

make important

let

the

1

non

of the non
-

-

issue,

can be

custodial parent

custodial parent participate

decisions concerning the education or medical

treatment of the child jointly ,233 while minor decisions don't need the involvement of
the

non

-

custodial parent.234

225 Ellen A. Waldman, The Role
Va.

J.

Soc. Pol'y

m
227 m
228 m
229 m
230 m
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Finally, a consideration of the likely results of judicial review of mediated

money by

settlements can help parties and mediators save time and
realistic

and will be accepted by the judge

Different from the

norms

Two -

after

mediation

^

is

finished. 235

Tiered Model, the supporters of the inclusion of legal

into the mediation process strictly reject the

the mediation process. ^^6

is

negotiating what

mediator

who

involvement of outside attorneys in

has to interrupt the mediation process every

time a legal issue arises risks the success of the whole process and renders a disservice
to his clients. 237 Instead

of a continuous and informed negotiation he offers a series of

interrupted discussions.238
Finally, the

knowledge of

mediator to overcome obstacles,
to

compromise on

legal principles

if the

certain issues.239

and concepts can also help the

mediation process

As

is

stuck and both parties refuse

the classic theory of "principled negotiation"240

points out, this situation asks for the application of objective criteria. If both spouses are

unwilling to agree on a certain custodial or financial agreement, the mediator can

promote communication by referring

to the legal positions

of both spouses

in a court

-

litigated divorce process.

The knowledge of
Agreement) or

their

the parties'

WATNA

promote further negotiations

know

BATNA

(Best Alternative

(Worst Alternative To

in the

A

To

A

Negotiated

Negotiated Agreement)241 can

mediation process, because both divorcing spouses

the facts to decide whether the continuation of mediation

is

more favorable

M
236 m
235

237 w.
238/^.

239

M

240 Roger Fisher
241 Fisher

&

& Ury,

William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving

id,

104 -05.

In,

85

(

1

98 1 ).
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litigation in court or

whether they could get more of the "marital pie" by relying on the

legal system, rather than tailoring their

Supporters of this

last

own

solution.

theory underline that well informed mediators can best

balance power between spouses during the mediation process.242
intellectually or emotionally stronger

Jq prevent

the

spouse from dominating the weaker partner, the

mediator has to be familiar with legal norms, precedent divorce cases and court
decisions, as well as with legislative plans with potential influence

on the

actual divorce

case.243

Whereas the

legally trained mediator can support the

the necessary information to balance the

weaker spouse and provide

power between the divorcing husband and

wife, the review of a drafted settlement by an attorney only after the parties have
to

an agreement provokes legitimate criticism by feminists^'*^ ^^^t

informal and outside of the traditional adversarial court

-

i)^[^

come

method

is

litigation.245

C) The Third Model

The advocates of

the "Third

Model" suggest

the participation of lawyers in

every mediation session for reducing existing power imbalances between divorcing
spouses.246 These "third model" advocates object to the legal regulation of the

2^+2 Ellen A.

Waldman, The Challenge Of Certification:

Preserving Diversity, 30 U.S.F.L. Rev. 723, 738
^'^^ Ellen

Va.

J.

244

M

A. Waldman, The Role

Soc. Pol'y

& L.

87, 107

-

1

-

How
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Ensure Mediator Competence While

40 (1996).

Of Legal Norms

In Divorce Mediation:

An Argument For
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1

15 (1993).
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(1994);
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mediation process because of

its

"rigid

and categorical obligations", ^^^^ which lead

inflexible outcomes. In addition, the presence

to

of both lawyers and mediators adds

unnecessarily high costs.248

1)

The regulatory approach

The regulatory approach of mediation
the mediation process and

is

a contribution to

is

based on the participation of lawyers in

more

fairness

among

the parties. 249

More

lawyer participation can be achieved by legal rules, which abolish the exclusion of
lawyers from the mediation process and encourage their participation by increasing the
variety of topics to be discussed in the mediation session, such as property division,

alimony, maintenance and other financial issues, which

Another contribution

to increasing fairness in

make

legal advice necessary .250

mandated mediation sessions

is

the inclusion of "court review of mediated agreements", as well as the exclusion of the

mediator's recommendation to the court. The fairness concerns in mandatory mediation

can be met by increased lawyer participation or the "judicial review of agreements", and
the exclusion of pressure

on the

the mediation process, added

parties to reach

an agreement.251

By lawyer presence

by the modification of some ground

rules, the

in

power

imbalance between spouses can be met effectively.252 xhe unpredictable and often

changing circumstances during the divorce process which can lead to unpredictable

power changes can

also be

met

effectively

by the presence of lawyers who can balance

247 Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers: Challenging
The
Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1317, 1376 - 78
(1995).

248

m

249 /J

at

1374; Joel

M. Douglas, Lynn

J.

Maier, Bringing The Parties Apart, 49

-

SEP

Disp. Resol.

J.

29,

33(1994).

250 Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring
In The Lawyers: Challenging The
Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation. 79 Minn.L.Rev. 1317, 1375 (1995).
251

M

252 Joel M. Douglas, Lynn

J.

Maier, Bringing The Parties Apart, 49

-

SEP

Disp. Resol.

J.

29, 33 (1994).
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and offer assistance when these unforeseen changes happen. 253 Even

which one spouse largely dominates the process, the

presence

in situations in

of a

powerful

"spokesperson" for the weaker spouse can increase the fairness of the discussion. -^'^ In
domestic violence cases the lawyers can prevent or

at least

diminish a direct encounter

with the abusing spouse and thereby largely prevent an unfair discussion. 255

Some
parties

and

effective

to deal

means used by lawyers

in these

abuse cases are to separate the

with each one alone by allowing generous "time outs"256 i^ cases of

past abuse, lawyers can

warn

their clients against

agreements that are too one sided, or

simply not very likely to be upheld and followed over a long period. ^57

When

lawyer attendance during mediation

of "issue limitation"
that the

for a

to

is

guaranteed, the difficult approach

meet the power imbalance becomes unnecessary: The danger

powerful party links several different issues such as child custody in exchange

more favorable economic outcome,

is

excluded because lawyers can effectively

advise on these issues.258 xhe absence of lawyers in mediation often leaves the parties

alone with a mediator

who

is

not legally trained and cannot discover unfair and one

sided settlements.259 Lawyers have to compensate for

253 Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard

Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness
254/^.

255/^
256/^.
257/^.
258/^.

259
260

m
m

at

1376-78.

J.

weak mediators.260

Maiman, Bring

In The Lawyers: Challenging The

In Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1317,

1

376

(

1
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2)

The "Voluntary

In

the

voluntary

mediation process

is

Participation" approach
participation

approach the assistance of lawyers

in

the

not mandatory but possible. 261 In this approach, however, lawyers

face the daunting task of predicting difficulties and unfairness in the individual process,

and attending only those sessions where problems are anticipated. Because these
predictions can be false, the "voluntary participation" approach

is

very risky.262

Voluntary participation of lawyers can also lead to increased costs,
responsible for paying the fees.
is

a dispute resolution

3) Critics

The

method

As

diverse issues. 264

a study in Ohio has proven, mediation in these cases

-

Participating" approach in mandatory mediation

of mandatory mediation

When

mediation

is

this

lavyyers.

Many

vyith regulated

mandated,

traditional lawyer- lead negotiation? Critics

whether

lawyer participation target

there any difference from the

is

of lawyer

-

participated mediation question

kind of mediation really differs from the traditional negotiation lead by
attorneys, however, underline the positive contribution of mediation to

the traditionally negotiated process265 because
difficulties in

are

for wealthy couples only.263

of the "Lawyer

critics

if parties

it

leads to

more

efficiency,

smoothes the

communication, provides parties with the opportunity to get involved in

the settlement process266 and influences

it

actively.267

2"' Id at 1347; Andre G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation For Battered Women, 15
Harv. Women's L. J. 272, 272-73 (1992).

262
263

M
jd.;

Jeanne Clement

Volunteer,

et a!., Descriptive

Mandatory or No Custody/

Study of Children Whose' Parents Are Participating
Mediation 16, 17 (1993).

in

Visitation

264 Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers:
Challenging The
Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1317, 1376 - 78
(1995).

265

266

M
/J.

267 Steven C. Bowman, Idaho's Decision On Divorce Mediation, 26 Idaho L. Rev. 547, 555 - 57
(1989);
Lawrence D. Gaughan, Divorce Mediation: A Lawyer's View. 9 FAM ADVOC 34, 36 (Summer 1986).
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By

bringing both parties together for discussion of their issues, the normally

very long procedure of settlement negotiations can be shortened^^^ because the

which

conciliatory approach of mediation diminishes the confrontation

is

inherent in

every adversarial dispute resolution.
In

summary, the

participation of lawyers in mediation helps both the parties

the lawyers. Often parties in a lawyer
the latest development,269 and

-

and

lead negotiation feel ignored, not informed about

mere observers of

their

own

cases, waiting for the

attorneys to shape the outcome. In mediation the lawyer gets in touch with the opposite

party herself and gets direct information, which might be neglected or hidden in

negotiation with the opposite attomey.^^Oin addition, the discussion with the opposite
party gives the lawyer a new,

more objective view on

reevaluate this story and add or correct

some

his

own

client's story;

facts that his client

he can

might have omitted

purposefully or simply forgotten to mention.^^l
It is

not only the lawyer but also the client

who

profits

from the

direct contact

with the opposite party. The parties not only have the opportunity to communicate with
the other spouse,

which

is

the essential idea of mediation versus litigation, but they also

get the opportunity to talk to the opposite counsel.

As many

divorce clients have

reported, this opportunity to talk directly to the other party's advocate gives

them the

sense of "telling their story" to someone "official".2'72

26° Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers: Challenging The
Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1317, 1378 - 79
(1995).
269/c^. at

1380-82.

2^0 Thomas

J.

Stipanowich, The Quiet Revolution

Mediation, 81 Ky. L.

J.

Comes To Kentucky: A Case Study

In

Community

855, 900-903 (1993).

2/1 Craig A. Mcewen, Nancy H. Rogers, Richard

J. Maiman, Bring In The Lawyers: Challenging The
Dominant Approaches To Ensuring Fairness In Divorce Mediation, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1317, 1380 - 82

(1995).

272/^.

at

1382-84.
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A long
improve

their

-

term effect on lawyers by bringing them into the mediation process

poor reputation and their behavior, which

is

is

to

often considered to be

uncompromising and confrontational.^^S
4)

Does

-

self

determination of parties in the mediation process necessarily

exclude lawyer participation?

Lawyer

participated mandator)' mediation can conflict with the goal of self

determination of clients. Mandated mediation cases
litigation in court,

has

which

many advantages

in

parties

sometimes might

comparison

become an unwanted hurdle before
favor.2'74 still

to the voluntary approach,

parties in

mandated mediation are required

their case,

what goals they pursue, and whether these goals are

Does mandated lawyer

5)

process?
sessions

One of
is

the

-

mandated mediation
one of which

is

that

to think independently about the issues

of

realistic.^^S

participation lead to increased costs of the mediation

main concerns

resulting

from lawyer

-

participation in mediation

the possibility of increased costs,2'76 whereas mediation has the reputation of

a low cost dispute resolution method.

According

to

one research study, lawyers disagree about the cost of attorney

participation in mediation.2'77

can be reduced

if the

Some

interviewees underline that mediation session costs

session does not cover

all

divorce issues^^S and the lawyers help

to tackle issues early in the mediation process.2'79

273

m

274/^.

at

1384-86.

275/^.

at

1386 -88.

276/j.

at

1388-90.

277

m

278

m
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many

In addition,

parties,

even without mandated lawyer - presence,

stage of the mediation process, need legal counseling,

analyze and

to

cover after mediation,

if

given by lawyers outside of the mediation process. 280 Another

significant advantage of lawyer
to

some

which only lawyers can provide,

and which can tremendously increase the costs parties have
this consultation is

at

evaluate

-

cases

attended mediation
before

assigning

is

that courts

them

to

have a lesser burden

be mediated.28I

procedures involve party attendance and sometimes attorney participation.282
other hand, lawyers assisting in the mediation process

mediated outcome unnecessary. Even

if

make

legal assessment

These

On

the

of the

the parties in the mediation process cannot

agree to a settlement, the participation of lawyers can help to analyze the problems,
define issues and thereby help the parties and judges in a litigated process after

mediation has
litigation,

in

court

failed. 283

Mandated mediation

is,

therefore, not an additional hurdle to

but a significant factor which changes the structure of the traditional litigation
substantially

by providing more efficiency and decreasing

summary, research suggests mandatory mediation

assisted

in

costs.284

by lawyers does not lead

higher costs,285 but even after an unsuccessful mediation paves the

way

for a fast

to

and

efficient litigation in court.

It is

time

-

effective286 and at least not

post- mediation lawyer participation.

lawyer participation

is

The

more expensive than mediation with a

difference fi"om the mediation cases without

only that in the former cases the fees that parties accrue in the

280;^
281

jd_

282/j.

at

1388.

283/^.

284

m

285;^.

286 Id

at

1392; Jane Orbeton

&

Paul G. Charbonneau,

Relations Cases, Mediation Q., Winter 1988, 61, 64-67.
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divorce process, are shared between mediator and lawyer.^^'^ Finally, mediators,

who

normally have no law degree, often need the assistance of legally trained experts,

who

can help

to balance the

power between

and thereby contribute to more fairness

parties

in

the divorce process.288

D) Mediation
Critics

of

this

model

hostility

in

Child Custody Disputes

of the traditional adversarial model have increasingly highlighted failures
in the sensitive child custody issue

because

it

increases conflicts and

between parents, which have devastating effects upon the

child's

well

-

being.289
In contrast, the mediation alternative
individual cases than
interests

on the

is less

setting or analyzing

of the disputants, their emotional well

period and the long-term relationship

among

-

formalized and more focused on the

of rules.^^O Therefore, non-economic
being, especially in the post-divorce

parents and children are

much more

in the

center of the mediation process than in the traditional adversarial concept.291

Another advantage of mediation

in child custody disputes is the

involvement of

mental health professionals that are sensitive to the emotional difficulties divorcing
parents have in communicating with each other about child custody.

One

hotly disputed

M
288 m
287
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issue

whether legal or mental health experts are the better mediators

is

custody

in child

disputes.

1)

Attorneys as mediators in child custody disputes

Attorney

-

from taking sides with one party.292 Howeyer, attorney

refrain

classified into

two

distinct groups, those

legal adyice to neither.

parties

who

mediators haye the role of neutral third parties,

The

first

who

mediators can be

counsel both parties and those

group of attorney

whether or not they considered

-

consciously

-

who

give

mediators simply explains to the

their adverse claims

and

interests as realistic

under the presuppositions established by law.

The second group views

their role as a

legal advice during the mediation process at

and

facilitate

discussion between the ex

mere

all,

neutral third party,

who

gives no

but has only the function to stimulate

spouses on a rational basis. Often these

-

mediators advise both parties to have legal counseling outside the mediation process.293
2)

The advantages of an attorney - mediators

The major advantage which attorney
without a legal education

is

-

in child

custody cases

mediators have in contrast to mediators

the possibility of advising parties or at least informing

them294 about legal issues of child custody, to review the

final

settlement after

mediation295 and ensure more confidentiality than can be offered by non

-

lawyer

mediation.296

292/^.
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470 -71.

2"^ Russell M. Coombs, Noncourt - Connected Mediation and Counseling

17FAM.
294
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GOLDEN GATE U.L.REV.
295

Nichol

Harm

Child- Custody Disputes,

's

Way? Family Mediation and

the Role of the Attorney Advocate, 23

717, 742 (1993).

M. Schoenfield,

Turf Battles

Qualifications In Child Custody Disputes,

1 1

And

Ohio

Professional

St. J.

Biases:

FAM.L.Q.

469, 491(1984).

An

Analysis

Of

Mediator

on Disp. Resol. 469, 470 - 71 (1996).

296 Russell M. Coombs, Noncourt - Connected Mediation and Counseling
17

in

Q.469,475(1984).

in

Child

-

Custody Disputes,
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In child custody cases the lawyer

-

mediators can point out the legal rights that

spouses have under the law of the state and the legal meaning of an agreement on child
custody. 297 Informed about their legal situation parties in a divorce process can better

decide which their starting position in negotiation

and whether

is

it is

worth insisting on

positions and goals which are legally not realistic.^^S
Finally, if parties are

informed about

outcome over a long term and

will accept the final custodial

obligations

much

is

much

higher than

better arrangement

by

their legal rights, the probability that they

if

act according to their

they finally discover that they would have gained a

litigating the child

custody issue.299

having an attorney mediating the divorce case

is

a major advantage

of

the likelihood that an agreement

reached by the parties will be accepted by the courts in the final divorce decree. Parties
will not waste time negotiating

on an agreement

judicial review.^OO Additionally, despite the
parties

have a better opportunity

However,

this

approach

is

that has

non

to vent anger

-

no chance

therapeutic nature of mediation,

and

let

steam off than

many

297

in litigation.

ethical responsibilities

is

towards their

than with other professionals.302

m

298 Susan C. Kuhn, Comment: Mandatory Mediation: California Civil Code Section 4607. 33
L.J. 733,766(1984).
299 Kuhn,

M. Schoenfield,

Turf Battles

Qualifications In Child Custody Disputes.

301 Id

m

EMORY

id.

300 Nichol

302

it

aim attorneys are more

other experts.^Ol Finally, the confidentiality of clients' data

more ensured with lawyer - mediators, who have
clients,

its

not aimed at dealing with psychological problems; rather

favors an external data gathering and dispute resolution, an
familiar with than

to survive the final

1

1

And

Ohio

Professional

St. J.

Biases:

An

on Disp. Resol. 469, 472

Analysis
-

Of Mediator

73 (1996).

54
3)

Dangers of lawyer - mediators

There

are,

in child

custody disputes

however, some weak points attorney

-

mediators might have

contrast to other experts as mediators in child custody cases. ^03

in

xhe mediation process

has the inherent nature of reconciliation rather than of confrontation while legal
education

is

traditionally based

on the adversarial problem solving method, which

detrimental to the cooperative problem

Another

risk

power imbalance,

if

which might

-

arise

solving approach in mediation.^^^

from the adversarial system

had already existed

it

is

the increase of

in the marital relationship. 305

mediator, due to his training in the adversarial dispute resolution method,
likely than a
to define

non

and

-

is

a

lawyer -

may

be less

lawyer to discover these imbalances, and to help the weaker spouse

assert her position. Especially in child custody disputes critics

emphasize

the tendency of lawyers to ignore the emotional difficulties of their clients and to focus

on

facts

and exterior problems more than on the emotions involved when fighting over a

child. 306

According

to this opinion, lawyers are

agreement that they can take

much more

interested in reaching an

to court for approval than getting involved in unresolved

and complex emotional issues.^O^

However, many lawyers' lack
not necessarily a hurdle to
reconcile the parties but to
that both parties

303

Id. at

become
work

in psychological training or behavioral science is

a good mediator.

in a fair

The aim of mediation

is

not to

atmosphere and to find a balanced agreement

can live with.308 Family lawyers usually possess the

skills

necessary to

474.

m
305 m
306 m
304

•^0
'

Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change
HARV. L. PIEV. 727, 757 (1988).

in

Child Custody

Decisionmaking.

308 Nichol M. Schoenfield, Turf Battles And Professional Biases: An Analysis
Of Mediator Qualification
in Child Custody Disputes.
1 Ohio St. J. On Disp. Resol. 469, 476 - 77 (1996).
1
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mediate child custody disputes, namely a good knowledge of people, well developed

and convincing counseling

ability

The lack of psychological

skills,

imbalance between spouses

is

and a sense of what
however,

is

is realistic in

a negotiation. ^^^

a serious argument as far as the

power

concerned. Lawyers are often so concerned with reaching

a settlement and increasing their reputation as being successful counselors, that they

may

recognize the weaker position of one party

fail to

but ignore

when

it

the proper course

and advise the weaker spouse

may have been

to start a court

and worse, they may recognize

-

to terminate the

mediation session

litigation.^'^

-

E) The regulation of mediation in Georgia - statutes and rules
Courts
statutes set

and

all

over the U.S. have recognized the significance of

up by the

states to regulate the

ADR. However

the

mediation process, the selection of mediators,

their responsibility are quite diverse.

Georgia has a widespread use of Alternative Dispute Resolution, especially
mediation.^!! In 1992 the Supreme Court of Georgia adopted the recommendations of
the Joint

Commission on

processes.^ 12

giving every

trial

Yh^ courts however developed
of cases

certain types

ADR

to

ADR and

sets

court the possibility to

their

own

employ

ADR

program, which refers only

up a certain type of ADR

-

procedure for these

cases. 31^

30^ Lawrence D. Gaughan, Divorce Mediation: An Important

Summer

1986,

310 Leonard L.Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43
311 Peter

312 jd

S. Chantilis,

at

Create and

Mediation U.S.A., 26 U.

OHIO

Mem.

Fund Alternative Dispute

Rev. 91 (1993).
/£/.

ST.

L.J. 29,

L. Rev., 1031,

Role for Lawyers, VA. B.A.J.,

40 (1982).

1045

-

(1996).

- Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution Act:
Resolution Programs in Each Country in Georgia^ 10 Ga. St. U. L.

1045; Melissa Lee Himes, Georgia Court

313 Chantilis,

New

at 10.
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Furthermore the Supreme Court founded the Georgia Commission on Dispute
Resolution.^''* This

commission

mediators in the court

-

set

up standards

for the qualification of neutrals as

administered program.315 xhe requirement basically consists of

a theoretical training and observation

of a mediation process in domestic

Family mediators need a training of 45 hours. ^'^ For becoming a mediator

and custody cases a special additional training

The courts
guidelines.3'^

in

in

domestic violence

is

relations.
in divorce

required.

Georgia are provided with special model mediation rules as

Remarkably

Georgia

acknowledged the significance of ADR

is

the

only

state

in

the

U.S.

for the legal system: all lawyers in

required to get continuing legal education in

ADR.^'^ According

which

has

Georgia are

to Georgia's

Code of

Professional Responsibility the lawyers in Georgia have the legal duty to advise
potential clients about Alternative Dispute Resolution.^'^

'^ Melissa

Lee Himes, Georgia Court - Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution Act: Create and Fund
Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs in Each County in Georgia^ 10 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 93 (1993).
•^

315 Peter

S. Chantilis,

Mediation U.S.A., 26 U.

Mem.

L. Rev., 1031,

1048 (1996).

316

m

^'

Judy C. Cohn, Custody Disputes: The Case for Independent Lawyer - Mediators, 10 Ga.St.U. L.

'

Rev. 487, 492-93(1994).

318 Peter

319

m

S. Chantilis,

Mediation U.S.A., 26 U.

Mem.

L. Rev., 1031,

1048 (1996).

CHAPTER V
CONFIDENTIALITY IN MEDIA TION

A) Confidentiality

in

Mediation

Confidentiality in mediation
parties

is

often prefer to mediate the

essential for

issues

its

success. In divorce cases

rather than

importance of non-disclosure of confidential information
protection of secret information.
party tries to use information

is

litigate

them

in

where

court,

the

higher than in other cases of

The question of confidentiality becomes

relevant if one

which was disclosed during a mediation session

in a later

court litigation against the other spouse if mediation could not lead to a satisfactory

outcome.320 j^e issue of confidentiality can also come up

subpoena the mediator or the information the mediator got

if

one spouse

tries to

in joint or private session

with the parties, either to sue the mediator for malpractice or to support her point of

view

in a

subsequent litigation against the other spouse. Even after the parties have

reached an agreement in mediation, one spouse might be interested in using secret
information, gathered during the mediation process in a subsequent court

enforce this agreement or

when spouses

later disagree

-

litigation to

about what the outcome of the

mediation process was.^^l Especially in these situations the party

who

relied

on the

confidentiality of the information disclosed during mediation needs protection fi"om

unwanted disclosure.

320 John

S.

Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward

F.

Sherman, Processes

321 /d

57

Of Dispute Resolution, 379

(1996).
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1) Effective

Mediators

mediation requires confidentiality^^^

in divorce cases

have to help the couple

to identify issues

and the

underlying reasons for their conflicts, in order to promote a long-lasting post-marital

agreement. Therefore they help to promote a discussion about possible alternative
solutions to problems

which

arise after divorce.

They have

spouses together, help them to reach an agreement on post
that this final settlement will be carried out.
their

deeper

interests, as well as their goals

-

to bring the divorcing

divorce issues and ensure

Because parties necessarily have

to disclose

during mediation, the perspective that these

secrets can be disclosed in a subsequent court litigation can tempt parties to be dishonest

and mislead

their

spouse during mediation.^^S Compromises

require the disclosure of facts that are unfavorable and therefore
in

in

negotiations often

would not be disclosed

an adversarial litigation process. ^^4
2) Fairness in mediation requires confidentiality
In the traditional litigation process, rules of evidence

the

legal

and procedure, as well as

advice by attorneys, protect parties and limit disclosure.325

Parties

in

mediation rely on the confidentiality of the information given and often don't consider
that these

communications might be disclosed

later.

Because the weaker and

less

sophisticated spouse can easily be taken advantage of, a disclosure of secret information

by the other spouse would be seriously unfair to her.326
spouse could easily use

Id.

at

380; Jay Folberg, Confidentiality

edited by Jay Folberg &.

323 John

324

/J.

m
326 m
327 m
325

clever and sophisticated

purpose of discovery of secret information

he can use against the intellectually weaker spouse in court.^^?

that

^^^

this situation for the

a

S.

Ann

and

Privilege in Divorce Mediation, in divorce mediation,

Milne, 320 (1988).

Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward

F.

Sherman, Processes

Of Dispute Resolution. 380

(1996).
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3) Confidentiality

The danger

and mediator's neutrality

that the

become an adversary

in a

who

mediator,

should be neutral and unbiased, could

subsequent litigation process would prevent most parties from

openly discussing interests and problems during the mediation process. ^^8 j\^q party

who might be

disfavored by the mediator's testimony in court could

feel

taken

advantage of by a biased and partial mediator.329 y^js fg^r alone, that the mediator
could be biased and favor one party by disclosing confidential information of the other
party during a potential subsequent litigation, could fi^om the very beginning destroy the

confidence between the mediator and his clients and would

make

the mediation process

inefficient.33^

4) Confidentiality as a major reason to favor mediation to litigation

Many

divorcing spouses decide to mediate their disputes rather than litigate

them because they do not want
settle

to "air the dirty laundry"^^

'

in the public

and prefer

to

a dispute without paying the price of damaging one's reputation. Therefore, if

confidential information can be disclosed, the mediation process looses this major

advantage to the traditional court - litigated divorce.

Mediators need confidentiality

5)

Lack of confidentiality

in

mediation

is

not only risky for divorcing spouses but

frequent subpoenas to testify about the outcomes of mediation can also frustrate
enthusiastic mediators and prevent

many

addition,

328

mediators

who

them from volunteer work

in this

field.332

are imcertain about having to testify in court

j^

and about

m

329/^.
330/^.
3^1 Id; Jay Folberg, Confidentiality and Privilege in Divorce Mediation,
Jay Folberg

& Ann Milne,

332 John

Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward

S.

at

in

divorce mediation, edited by

326 (1988).
F.

Sherman, Processes

Of Dispute Resolution. 380

(1996).
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the

confidentiality

might

of their records,

destroy

these

documents

to

protect

confidentiality. 3^3

B) Restrictions to confidentiality

The

critics

of a broad assumption of confidentiality

number of cases.^^^An attempt

certain

complete disclosure and

which have

to

full

mediation claim that the

rule can only be limited in a

man's evidence"^^^ as a basic procedural

right to "'every

in

to reconcile these

two extreme positions of

confidentiality of the information

is to

categorize the issues

remain confidential. One solution could be to keep confidential the

whether a settlement was reached,

its

conditions, the

documents

parties

facts,

have disclosed

during mediation, the impressions and opinions of the mediator and his suggestions to
the parties,^36 Another category of confidential information protects the persons

who

should be able to enforce confidentiality, such as the main participants in the mediation
process and courts, as well as witnesses. ^^^ The persons

who

could be obliged to keep

information confidential are the parties, the mediator and private or public third
parties. 338

To sum

own

up, confidentiality should be granted

interests tries to

a party in mediation in her

subpoena statements, documents or opinions of the mediator or the

other party in a subsequent litigation process over the

same person

when

same

legal matter

and against the

as in mediation; however, interests of third parties or the public should not

be involved.339

333/^.

at

381.

m
335 m
334

336 Eric D. Green, A Heretical View
of a Mediation Privilege^ 2 Ohio
337 John

m
339 m
338

S.

Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward

F.

Sherman, Processes

St. J.

Dispute Res.

1,

32 (1986).

Of Dispute Resolution. 380

(1996).
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C) Judicial or Statutory Protection of Confidentiality

Some
by

jurisdictions recognize a mediation privilege,

However,

statute.^'*^

established by

common

1) Judicially

Some

imposed

either

by court or

number of

to provide full evidence in court the

privileges

law has gradually been reduced.^'*'

created privilege

courts have accepted certain conditions as the presuppositions of any

privilege in court.

The

parties

must have confidence

that the information given during

the mediation process will not be disclosed.3'^2 j^is confidence

must be

essential for the

maintaining of a good relationship between the parties; furthermore, this relationship

must be one of high value and therefore has
community. 343
injury

it

Finally,

to

be protected in the interest of the

comparing the benefits of disclosure and the benefits

to

it

to the

might cause, the benefit must be greater than the injury of disclosing

confidential information.344

However, whether the relationship between divorcing
always

fulfills

The
information

these criteria

first criteria

is

normally

of

is

parties'

fulfilled.

confidence in the mediator not to disclose secret

However, according
it is

the details of every confidentiality agreement

at

393.

342 jd

at

394.

m
344 m
345 M

at

396.

341/^.

343

346 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 401.

to the Federal

meets "the principles of the

of reason and experience."346 Jq meet

340/^

and mediators

questionable.345

a privilege can only be granted if
light

parties

this criteria

between the

Rules of Evidence

common law

in the

of a "reasonable" confidence
parties

and the mediator can
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become

important.^'^^ In

agreement

in written

form

most cases courts are willing

to protect parties only if

exists.

The second presupposition of

a mediation privilege, that confidentiality

vital

importance for the relationship between the parties and their mediator,

more

difficult to fulfill. ^"^^

pointing out that

many

an

Some commentators

states

is

is

of

often

argue against a mediation privilege by

have successful mediation without a privilege and even

if

a mediation privilege should be essential for the quality of this relationship, they

assume, that a "limited rather than absolute privilege,

Other commentators question whether non

harm

the profession of mediators.

-

They assume

is

sufficient."349

privilege in mediation
that

even

would

if doctors,

really

lawyers or

mediators have to disclose confidential information, they would not be out of work,

because their service would
relationship

is

still

be needed.^^^ Even though the mediator

based on confidence, the parties in

this

-

client

process will normally not

terminate their relationship just because of the danger of unpleasant disclosure.^^^

However, commentators
is

in favor

of a mediation privilege emphasize that confidentiality

a precondition to parties to open up and discuss freely without fear, that secrets will

become public352 and

accessible to friends, family

members, and employers.

Finally, the mediation privilege could further frustrate the purpose of potential
litigants

^^' John

who

S.

decide to mediate before litigation, and to subpoena the mediator and his

Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward

F.

Sherman, Processes of Dispute Resolution, The Role of

the Lawyers, 394(1996).

348

/J.

349 Eric D. Green,

A

Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 Ohio

St. J.

on Dispute Resolution

1,

32

(1986).

350 John

S.

Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward

the Lawyers, 394(1996).

351m
352

m

F.

Sherman, Processes of Dispute Resolution. The Role of

63

documents

into a subsequent litigation process. ^53 Consequently, parties will consider

seriously the pros and cons of a pre

should spend time

in

-

mediation session, and whether they

litigation

mediation, which in their case could be too time

-

consuming and

therefore less effective. 354

Another

of the mediation privilege emphasizes that because of

critic

However, even the testimony of a

privilege parties can hide the truth in court.355

mediator

not a guarantee for the truth:^^^

is

The mediator can

prospect that the parties can subpoena him, and force

mediation process, as well as some statements

tempt one or both spouses to

good

faith or otherwise,

lie

him

made by

in court

and the
of the

the divorcing couple, might

during mediation. 357 xhe mediator consequently, in

would expose these

lies in court.358

conception of dispute resolution in mediation and
necessarily adversarial and the mediator,
-

lie

to testify about details

Another argument against a mediator's testimony

cooperative, problem

this

who

is

court

in

litigation.

A

is

the

different

court litigation

is

used to approach a conflict in a

solving way, might not be a good witness in a competitive and

adversarial litigation process. 359
It is

debated

for the recognition

among mediators and

in courts

of a mediation privilege are

interested in maintaining the relationship

whether the

fulfilled

-

last

two presuppositions

whether the community

between the mediator and his

clients,

is

and

whether the benefits of disclosing confidential information outweigh the disadvantages.

353

Mat 395.

m
355 m

354

356

yj.

m
m
359 m

357
358
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It is

doubtful whether judges

make

who have

to decide

on a mediation privilege

a positive decision and uphold confidentiality of information

in court will

which was disclosed

during the mediation sessions.^^^
2) Statutory regulation

Mediation legislation

of confidentiality

in the last

few years has

dealt widely with confidentiality

issues. 3^'

Meanwhile,

number

a

of jurisdictions

permits

several

exceptions

to

confidentiality requirements.

a) Contractual

An

Agreement

to Disclose Information

important statutory exception from confidentiality, recognized by a number

of states,362

is

based on the contractual agreement between the parties and mediator that

information disclosed during the mediation process can be disclosed in a subsequent
litigation process.^^^

^"^ Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation

Privilege, 2

Ohio

St. J.

on Dispute Res.

1,

34

(1986).

3ol Carol Izumi, Symposium on Standards
of Professional Conduct in Alternative Dispute Resolution,

1995

J.

of Dispute Resolution

362 Izumi,

id.

95.

referring to e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. Section

Section 2-7-202(b) (Michie 1993); Cal.Evid.Code Section
Section 13-22-307 (2)(a) (1993); Fla.Stat.Ann.
4-6-9-4(b)(2) (West 1994);

-

2238 (b)(l)(1993); Ark.Code Ann.

Section 44.102 (3) (West 1994); Ind.Code Ann. Section

Mich.Comp.Laws Section

69-2-47 (1993); Mo.Rev.Stat. Section 17.06

12

1152.5(a)(4) (West 1994); Colo.Rev.Stat.

691.- 1557(l)(a) (1993); Miss.Code Ann. Section

Mont.Code Ann. Section 26-1-811 (1993);
Section 328:C (9) (1993); N.D.Cent.Code
Section 31-04-11 (1993); Or.Rev.Stat. Section 36.205 (1991); Tenn.Code Ann. Section 36-4-130 (b)
(1993); Tex.Code Ann. Section 154.073 (b) (West 1994); Utah Code Ann. Section 78-3 lb-7(l)( 1993);
Va.Code Ann. Section 8.01-581.22 (Michie 1993); Wash.Rev.Code Section 5.60.070 (l)(a)(1994);

Neb.Rev.Stat. Section

(a) (1991);

25-2914 (1994); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann.

Wis.Stat.Ann. Section 904.085(4)(b) (West 1994); Wyo.Stat. Section 1.43-103 (1993).

363 Izumi, id
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b) Disciplinary actions against the mediator

The second exception from

confidentiahty, accepted in several states, arises in

disciplinary actions against the mediator364 j^ order to prove a breach of his duties,365

or

when

c) Integrity

Some

in a

agreement

subsequent action against the mediator.366

of the mediation process

states

allow the disclosure of confidential

of the mediation process

integrity

validity

damages

parties seek

itself.^^^

information to preserve the

The purpose might be

to enforce the actual

mediate^^S or to enforce the mediated agreement itself^^^ or to prove the

to

of the mediated agreement. 370

An

agreement might be invalid due to fraud,

duress or misrepresentation.^^^

d) Administration of Justice

Besides other exceptions that are of minor importance in divorce cases, some

have established the right to disclose information in order to maintain the

states

"administration of justice",372for example, to prove the prejudice of a witness. ^ 73

^^^ Izumi,

(West 1994).

referring to Fla.Stat.Ann. Section 44.102 (4)

id.

365 Izumi, id referring to Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. Section 12-2238 (b)(2) (1993); Colo.Rev.Stat. Section 1322-307 (2)(d) (1993); N.D.Cent.Code Section 31-04-1 (1993).
1

366

Izumi,

Section

id.

referring to, e.g.,

25-2914

Mich.Comp.Laws Section 691.-1557(l)(b) (1993); Neb.Rev.Stat.

(1994); Okla. Stat. Ann.

tit.

12, Section

1805

(f)

(West 1994); Or.Rev.Stat. Section

36.205(2)(b) (1991); Tenn.Code Ann. Section 36-4-130 (b) (2) (1993); Va.Code Ann. Section 8.01-

581.22 (Michie 1993); Wash.Rev.Code Section 5.60.070(g) (1994).

367 Izumi, id
368 Izumi,

id.

referring to Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. Section 12-2238 (b)(4)(1993).

369 Izumi,

id.

referring to Wyo.Stat. Section 1.43-103

370 Izumi,

id.

referring to

371 Carol Izumi,

© (v)(1993).

N.D.Cent.Code Section 31-04-1

1

(1993).

id.

^'^^Id

373 Izumi,

id.

referring to, e.g., Haw.Rev.Stat. Section

(1993); Wis.Stat.Ann. Section 904.085 (4)(e)(1994).

408 (1993); N.C.Gen.Stat. Section 7a-38(8)©

66
3) Contractual

Agreements

ConfidentialiW

to protect

Prior to mediation parties and the mediator can agree that

all

information

disclosed in joint or in separate mediation sessions will remain confidential and that the
parties will not

subsequent

possible

his notes of the mediation process in a

subpoena the mediator or
litigation.374

Many

mediation

such

programs,

as

the

ABA

Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in Family Disputes, frequently ask parties

and mediators

must be

to sign

an agreement of confidentiality. ^^^ To be valid,

in written form, clear

and specific enough

to

show mutual

this

agreement

consent. ^^^However,

an agreement between the mediator and the parties not to disclose information unless
participants in the mediation process agree to

suppress evidence in litigation.^^^ In Simrin

it,

v.

all

can conflict with public policy not to

Simrin the California Court of Appeals

upheld the confidentiality agreement between two spouses and a marriage counselor,

even though

it

conflicted with public policy, because this counseling

was aimed

at

preserving the marriage, and therefore an open and fearless discussion about private

problems was of vital importance.^^^

When husband

and wife are attending a marriage

counseling session they want to express their inner feelings and concerns, as well as
their interest in preserving the marital bond; otherwise "the

purpose of counseling

is

frustrated."379

However, there

is

a significant difference between cases of marriage counseling

and confidentiality issues on the one hand and divorce mediation on the other hand. The

^"^^

Kent

Brown, Confidentiality In Mediation: Status And Implications, 1991 J. Disp. Resol. 307, 318
Edward F. Sherman, Processes Of Dispute Resolution, 415

L.

(1991); John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau,
(1996).

^'^

ABA

^^" John
3'7'7

S.

Simrin

m
379 m
378

Standards of Practice for LoMyer Mediators

Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward
v.

F.

in

Family Disputes,

Sherman, Processes

Simrin 233 Cal. App. 2d 90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1964).
.

sec.

11.

Of Dispute

A.

Resolution, 416 (1996).

67
agreement of confidentiality

in

Simrin

v.

Simrin concerned a situation

in

which both

partners tried to preserve their marriage, whereas in divorce mediation parties have

already decided to get divorced and only try to reconcile differences as to the post

-

marital financial, custodial and property issues.
It

is

between the

^°^ John

S.

therefore doubtful whether a court
parties

and the mediator

that

Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward

F.

is

would generally uphold an agreement

contrary to public policy. ^^^

Sherman, Processes

Of Dispute

Resolution,

419 (1996).

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

The divorce process
system^^l
process.

multi

-

jg

highly emotional and complex; the "rigidity" of the court

^ot appropriate to meet the "emotional dynamics"^^^ of every divorce

The adversary, highly formal and

strict

procedural approach to a complex and

centered issue can even enlarge the gap and polarize the positions between the

divorcing spouses. ^83
marital

is

bond

Jhe

are diverse;

issues parties are facing after they decide to dissolve their

and so are the emotional challenges.

Mediators can have educational backgrounds other than law,

e.g.,

social

and

behavioral sciences, psychology and therapy,^^'^ and therefore are often better prepared
to deal

with the complex emotional issues in divorce cases. Lawyer - mediators,

however, can have the advantage of knowing the probable outcome

in a court

-

litigated

divorce process and they can provide the parties with a comparison of a mediated and
litigated process.

However, lawyer

-

mediators rarely have additional degrees in social

and behavioral sciences. ^85 Nevertheless, according

to scientific research, the

important qualities a mediator should have are "personality

38

1

Terenia Urban Guill,

traits",

most

^^^ enhanced by the

A Framework For Understanding And Using ADR,

71

Tul. L. Rev.

1323

(1997).

382 /(/at 1323 -1327.
383/^.

384 Scott Hughes, Elizabeth

's

Story: Exploring

Power Imbalances

In Divorce Mediation, 8 Geo.

J.

Legal

Ethics 553, 571 (1995).

385/^.

386 Jessica Pearson

et al.,

A

Portrait of Divorce Mediation Services in the Public

CONCILIATION CTS. REV.

1,

22 (1983).

68

and Private

Sector, 21

69
ability

be objective and credible; knowledge as well as experience are of

to

less

importance.

Books and

articles

on mediation, as well as other

ADR methods,

flood law libraries. Alternative processes of dispute resolution are
training in

law schools. However, even

adversarial court
future.

A

-

if

mediation

litigated process, legal rules

is

by

its

now

nature

£in

will continue to

part

of optional

alternative to the

and principles will play a larger role

in

process which does not provide a security net for the severely weaker party

with significantly less bargaining power will otherwise support "the survival of the
fittest".

its

Even though

the mediation process

is

a form of "private ordering"387^ which by

nature provides the possibility of tailoring an agreement adapted to the parties'

individual perception of justice, the mediation process in general takes place "in the

shadow of the law"^^^. Even though
efficiently

be settled

many

the

in mediation, cases

be excluded from mediation and settled

divorce cases can successfully and time-

of abuse and severe power imbalance have to
in court,

where

rules

of

civil

procedure and a

powerful judge can secure equal rights to share the marital pie after divorce.
In

summary, mediation

in divorce cases

has been highly successftil and enabled

divorcing couples to resolve their disputes in a

fair,

time- and cost-effective way.

Legislature and courts are working on the improvement of the mediation programs and
will ftirther legitimize this technique in family disputes, especially in divorce cases.

•^^^

John

S.

Murray, Alan Scott Rau, Edward

^°° Robert H. Mnookin
Divorce, 88 Yale L.

J.

&

F.

Sherman, Processes of Dispute Resolution, 310 (1996).

Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining

950, 968 (1979).

in the

Shadow of

the

Law: The Case for
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